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CIS

GLOBAL HUNGER IN 1991

HEARING

BEFORE THE

INTERNATIONAL TASK FORCE

OF THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON HUNGER
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SECOND CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HEARING HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, APRIL 25, 1991

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GLOBAL HUNGER IN 1991

THURSDAY, APRIL 25, 1991

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
INTERNATIONAL TASK FORCE,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON HUNGER,
Washington, D.C.

The task force met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in room 2222, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Byron Dorgan presiding.

Members present: Representatives Dorgan, Hall, Wolf, Penny, Emerson, Roukema, Bereuter, and Long.

Mr. DORGAN. We're going to call the hearing to order. Good morning to all of you. I'd like to welcome you to this hearing on global hunger in 1991.

This hearing is an attempt to represent an inventory of sorts of what is happening in the world in hunger, trying to understand where the emergency hunger spots are—some of them are clearly obvious from watching television these days, others almost as much of an emergency, but not quite so obvious—and then to try to determine whether chronic persistent hunger exists and what kinds of programs are underway in this country and others to respond to them.

All of us, when we watch the television and listen to the news, understand that substantial attention has been focused on the Kurdish refugees and their plight, including hunger and malnutrition and need for medical help. And it's true that the magnitude and the onset of that problem are almost unprecedented in a short period of time.

In the matter of just a couple of weeks, two million Iraqis have fled into Turkey and Iran. With no food supplies or sanitation, as many as 1,000 per day may be dying. Most are children. And, hopefully, an adequate response is now underway.

Meanwhile, less than 1,000 miles away from that spot, 21 million people in the Horn of Africa are in some serious trouble. Drought and civil strife have caused some very serious problems, and we are told that 300,000, particularly in Sudan alone, are at imminent risk of starvation just within a matter of weeks.

Today we will hear from some witnesses about the extent of the emergency in this region. Finding solutions to the problems in the Horn of Africa is the special focus of Bread for the World and a number of supporting groups as well.

And with their help, I have introduced with my colleagues Representative Wheat, Bereuter, Emerson, and others the Horn of Africa Recovery and Food Security Act, HR 1454. This legislation

emphasizes a peace initiative, the establishment of safe corridors for passage for emergency relief, and grass-roots development in the region. It would also prohibit non-humanitarian assistance to governments until they make progress towards peace.

In other regions of the world, hunger also persists. And we hear statistics that 40,000 children under the age of 5 die every day. There are no cameras focused on the face of these dying children. So they do not get the kind of attention we see in a short period of time in the mountains of Iraq.

The attention in the mountains of Iraq tends to focus on questions of policy: who won, who lost, is it working, isn't it, who's to blame, who isn't. And so there is a crush of attention to that region when we have this serious suffering by a large number of people.

But suffering exists in other parts of the world as well without nearly the attention and, therefore, in many cases without nearly the kind of response from the rest of the world that is necessary.

We will have witnesses today that discuss the constraints we face in trying to end abject poverty and hunger and specific strategies that are available for this.

The U.S. government has a role to play in establishing policies that, at the very least, do not exacerbate poverty in developing countries. Our aid programs can also be targeted for the most vulnerable groups around the world, and we can prioritize our goals, making hunger and poverty reduction first among them.

We will start the global survey of hunger with testimony today from Richard Bissell, Assistant Administrator for the Bureau of Science and Technology and U.S. A.I.D. He will be followed by witnesses from the Department of State and private relief organizations.

But first let me recognize my colleagues for any statements they may wish to recognize. Mr. Emerson?

Mr. EMERSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The declaration of the U.N. Food Conference in 1974 said that within a decade, no child will go to be hungry, no family will fear for its next day's bread, no human being's future will be stunted by malnutrition.

Today, 17 years later, we bear constant witness to the crippling effects of poverty and hunger around the world. Still these problems seem to be gaining on us.

From the flight of two million terrified Iraqis fighting over rounds of bread to the untold tens of thousands of Sudanese at risk of starvation, hoping that food aid will come before the rains do, to the plain, unforgiving fact that each day one billion of the world's people are hungry or vulnerable to hunger, we are reminded that on every front, on every continent, there are issues that need our urgent attention.

Today we're going to hear from our witnesses their thoughts on the root causes of hunger and their suggestions for what can be done to eradicate endemic deprivation in the future. And I look forward to hearing the testimony of all of them.

We know that the causes of hunger are many: poverty, civil conflict, poor policy planning, crushing national debt, natural disaster, inadequate infrastructure, and environmental degradation.

Faced with this list of horrors, should we simply wring our hands in despair? And the answer is, of course, emphatically no. There are solutions. There is hope. There has been progress.

It is clear to all of us, however, that no single solution is going to work to end all hunger everywhere. There must be a variety of strategies addressing both economies and individuals to combat these intractable problems.

If it means bringing warring parties to the negotiating table, let's try to do it. If it means creating new debt repayment schemes, we ought to look at that. If it means lending $50 to a woman in Bangladesh to start her own business, let's look at that, too. We simply need creativity, flexibility, and the will to do it.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DORGAN. Mr. Emerson, thank you very much.

Congresswoman Roukema?

Ms. ROUKEMA. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to take a few minutes to inform you and those here today about the recent congressional delegation, the trip to Turkey and the Turkish mountains where the Kurdish refugees have been, up to 900,000 of them, displaced in those mountains, facing severe deprivation.

As you certainly know and everyone here should know, Chairman Tony Hall was a member of that delegation, as was I and Congressman Smith, who is also a member of this committee.

I won't go into a long, detailed explanation, although I would think that Chairman Hall would have introduced into this record because I think it's appropriate the report that the co-del made to the speaker, as well as Republican leader Bob Michel, upon our return. And that report was also submitted to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, at their hearing the other day, as well as to Deputy Secretary Eagleburger, where we had a meeting with him Tuesday afternoon.

Just to summarize, I want the committee to know that this situation—I don't know who named it Operation Provide Comfort. It's a total misnomer. We understand that this is a life support system that is being set up. It is being set up at the direction of President Bush and under the auspices of the American military.

And that was uniformly endorsed by our congressional delegation visit, that, indeed, under the circumstances, both political as well as the geographic and logistical circumstances, the American military was undoubtedly the only, the only, people at this time that could move rapidly enough and with the proper equipment, essentially air-lift equipment with stockpiles in Germany and with the ability to deal with the Turkish government, to move to provide the relief at the time and to avoid what had the potential of being a genocidal catastrophe. I think you must understand that, both combining the Turkish problem with the problem of refugees in the Iranian mountain areas.

So it should be understood as having the potential of apocalyptic importance, but I must stress that upon my assessment and, I think, the assessment of everyone there, the arrival of relief supplies, water and, admittedly, inadequate food supplies, but, nevertheless, essential life support systems, being brought in there by the military did avert that kind of catastrophe. There is rampant disease. There is starvation, severe dehydration with, particularly,

the young and the old, babies and the elderly dying rapidly. But the reverse was there.

I also want to point out that there was total inadequate application, at that point in time over the weekend, of the use of the P.B.S.'s and the kind of personnel that they could bring in. However, that is quickly being adjusted.

And, by the way, it was not a consequence of any American action or inaction. It was a consequence of the difficulties with the Turkish government, difficulties that were both political as well as economic.

And, as valiantly as the red crescent tried to work, they were inadequate to the problem. And we are now getting, particularly, medical personnel, which the P.V.O.'s are very capable of delivering help, and in other areas as far as organization of camps, et cetera. So that is moving ahead.

And I want to commend A.I.D. and the Center for Disease Control, who are in there, moving in rapidly, making assessments necessary, and bringing in the help that we need.

Obviously,—and this is well understood by A.I.D., by all our military personnel there, and certainly by the ambassadors and political people, both the U.S. as well as U.N.—the emergency supplies that are being brought in are inadequate for the long term, and we are now shifting to giving priority to the influx of importation of staples in the diet.

And my message back here, and I think it's been heard by all, both here and in Turkey, that the infant formula and the dehydration problems with the babies has got to be addressed. Unfortunately, that was overlooked, either for logistical reasons or because of lack of understanding.

I think that we must understand that we don't—and I think this was alluded to by you and, certainly, articulated well by our Chairman, Tony Hall, but there are political problems here that have to be discussed in another context, but they do impact upon the direct delivery of relief by hunger agencies.

Those questions are being addressed, I see, by the headlines in yesterday's and today's papers. There seem to be projects. We'll hold our breath that the progress will be substantial and long-standing so that the political issues will be resolved and we will be able to persuade the Kurds of the necessity of moving out of those mountains holding areas down to the safe havens and in a short time frame. Our expectation is that we will move to repatriation in Iraq.

I won't going into those political questions. They would take too long. But the United States must take the leadership here with the U.N. and with the governments in the area involved. And I am confident that those successful efforts are presently underway.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. EMERSON. Would the gentle lady yield?

Ms. ROUKEMA. I'd be happy to yield.

Mr. EMERSON. I thank you.

I want to compliment you on your outstanding report, and I was delighted to hear it. I had the opportunity this past weekend to travel to the Sagwan camp in southern Iraq. And I don't think the

situation there is comparable to the ones that you and Mr. Hall saw up north. It's a whole different problem in the south.

Rather than go into it here and consume a lot of time with the committee, I would ask unanimous consent to submit a copy of the trip report that Mr. Montgomery and I submitted to the Speaker and the Minority leader——

Mr. DORGAN. Without objection.

Mr. EMERSON. So far as it bears on refugees and displaced persons.

Mr. DORGAN. Without objection.

Are there other openings——

Ms. ROUKEMA. Mr. Chairman?

Mr. DORGAN. Yes?

Ms. ROUKEMA. I do ask unanimous consent to put our report into the record.

Mr. DORGAN. Without objection.

Are there other opening comments or statements?

[No response.]

If not, we will ask Mr. Bissell—I understand I mispronounced your name, Mr. Bissell—Richard Bissell, Assistant Administrator for the Agency for International Development, to proceed. Mr. Bissell, we have a copy of your testimony. The entire testimony we would put into the record. And we would appreciate if you would summarize.

STATEMENT OF RICHARD BISSELL, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT; ACCOMPANIED BY ANDREW NATSIOS, DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF FOREIGN DISASTER ASSISTANCE

Mr. BISSELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your convening this hearing on an issue that certainly has come to our attention, both in the long term as well as in recent months. And it's an important opportunity to have a dialogue on whether or not we are adequately addressing the concerns that I think we share.

Let's make it clear what we're talking about. We're talking about 700 million people in the world who are chronically malnourished. We're talking about probably 150 million children in the world who are in serious danger of losing their lives owing to chronic malnutrition or undernourishment.

That's a staggering total, and I think it creates a moral challenge for all of us. It's one that we would like to find a way to address. Where I think, in fact, by and large, we understand the tools are required to address that, the question is making sure that people understand how it should be applied, that all of the players involved begin to understand that we have to address it seriously, and that, indeed, they are brought to bear in a coordinated way.

What I would like to do this morning is really to address four kinds of hunger briefly—and this will paraphrase my testimony, in large measure,—because I think it's a way of understanding the context in which we address the headlines of today and what we hope will not be the headlines of tomorrow because, generally, the bad news is what gets into the headlines.

The first kind of hunger that we are deeply concerned about is the short-term emergency hunger problems. We know about those: the Kurds, Sudan, many other places in the world where, in fact, there is an emergency.

And A.I.D. has a long history of addressing that problem. This year we are planning to program some $340 million in Title II assistance to address that kind of hunger, but it also involves, as the congresswoman said, introducing O.R.T. into the situation.

It is a broad-scale issue that we, in fact, have the tools to address. And later on I will defer to my colleague in terms of bringing you up to date on those particular emergency issues.

The second kind of hunger that I think we need to pay attention to is a medium-term kind of hunger, where there is persistent undernourishment or malnourishment. And this occurs for a variety of reasons.

One is simply mal distribution. People live in a part of the country or a part of the world where they can't grow enough food for themselves and they don't have access, for a variety of reasons, sometimes transportation, sometimes they don't have the income to buy it, to get access to the kind of food that they and that their familiarize need. This is a problem that we address through a variety of programs.

But those kinds of persistent shortfalls create what we call food insecurity, that we know and we can predict year in and year out that those people will need help.

The third kind of hunger I think we should pay attention to is a long-term hunger problem, and that's the question of a global balance between food and people. That addresses a variety of programs that A.I.D. has, but we know, and I think we should all recognize, indeed almost give thanks for the fact that at this current moment, for these years in history, we actually have adequate global food supplies.

And I think that lulls us to a certain extent. And it's a very dangerous kind of lulling that occurs because we have gone through a series of technological revolutions in the last 20 years, the Green Revolution and others, that have put in the hands of farmers, here as well as in developing countries, the capacity to grow enormous amounts of food.

Who would have thought 20 years ago that India today would be a food exporter? Who could have imagined that? And, yet, with the right technological tools, that is what they are today.

But even as we give thanks for that, we have to look out 10 years or 20 years, knowing that the balance between food and people goes in cycles. And the number of people on this earth continues to grow every year. And that extra 90 million people a year will need food.

And whether or not we are investing in terms of making sure that that food will be available for our children, for our grandchildren, it seems to me is a very important issue that we have to keep our minds on, even as we address other types of hunger.

The fourth kind of hunger I want to raise is what I call hidden hunger. And this is a very insidious one that I believe we are beginning to find the tools to address, one that this committee has

addressed in the past in terms of hidden hunger and others in the Congress.

It's Vitamin A deficiency, but it applies equally to iodine deficiency, to chronic iron deficiency. Iodine deficiency now, for instance, is estimated to affect a billion people worldwide, to one degree or another. It introduces stunted growth, cretinism, goiter and, yet, it's entirely reversible if one, in fact, introduces iodine into the diet.

One area that we are aggressively addressing right now is Vitamin A on the basis of an 18-year investment by A.I.D. in Vitamin A deficiency, an issue that is now recognizes in terms of research not only to cause blindness,—and I think we're all familiar with the programs to try to address Vitamin A that causes blindness—but it seems to also contribute to infant and small children's death to a very significant degree because they, in fact, end up being malnourished. It has to do with overall metabolism and growth and weight.

I outlined these four areas, and I want to give you a brief idea, working backwards, as to what A.I.D. is trying to do to address them. Issues of hidden hunger have been a focus of a good deal of discussion in the last year between ourselves, W.H.O., Unicef, and the scientists that we have supported over the years in looking at Vitamin A, at iodine, and other what we call micronutrient issues.

They're hidden in the sense that we don't see the visible signs of that deficiency related to it. It's not like a food intake issue. It has an insidious effect upon the metabolism, particularly, of children, and one that eventually affects and deprives those people of a full life, when they get older, indeed, a very early death.

We are addressing it through an expanded Vitamin A program. There will, in fact, be a major international meeting in Montreal in July to address the issues of micronutrients, of hidden hunger, to look at these problems across the world, to develop coordinated strategies by all of the donors and aid agencies to try to bring some sense to this and to address it aggressively now that we know both the impact of hidden hunger as well as the technical tools for meeting them. I think that conference will be very important, but I need to emphasize that it is a long-term education effort.

Whether or not a household chooses to use iodized salt or noniodized salt depends upon the decisions made by those in the household who are purchasing food and cooking the food. Therefore, the education effort in this area is one that requires us to make a long-term commitment.

Going back to the issue of long-term deficits, I believe that we are making very valuable investments in A.I.D.: on the food side in the sense of continuing to invest in agricultural research, coming up with much more efficient yielders in basic food crops, in terms of disseminating that technology, of generating the capacity in developing countries themselves to manage and to develop new agricultural technologies. It is an area where we are constantly breaking new ground.

I mention in my testimony, as an example, the work we have done on Striga in the Sudan, which will be beneficial for crops throughout the Saharan area.

In terms of long-term deficits, of course, we also have a very large family-planning program, one that continues to make investments in order of providing access to family-planning for couples throughout the developing world so that they can better plan their own balance between food availability and the size of their families.

In terms of medium-term persistent shortfalls and trying to develop food security, we work both with governments as well as broader-scale medium-term efforts.

Here, of course, it is not only a matter of constructing distribution systems, as I mentioned. It is attempting to raise income levels throughout developing countries so that they know they can afford the food that they need to avoid hunger.

This is a particular challenge in rural areas. And it's a problem where we have a long history of programs to raise rural incomes and where we will continue to pursue innovative approaches to them.

What matters above all in the medium term in most cases is to make sure that an incentive system exists within developing countries that farmers will want to grow crops, that they will bring them to market, that they will want to raise production, and that people who are the consumers are able to afford that food.

That connection, those linkages are terrible important to construct. In societies that are fragile and relatively underdeveloped, one cannot presume that they exist. We will continue to work in that area.

Lastly are a short-term emergency issues. And, Mr. Chairman, with your indulgence, I would like to turn to my colleague, Mr. Andrew Natsios, who is the Director of our Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, to fill you in much more fully than I possibly could in terms of what is happening in the Sudan and, if you wish, among the Kurds since he is directing that effort.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Richard Bissell appears at the conclusion of the hearing, p. 47.]

Mr. DORGAN. Mr. Natsios, you may proceed.

STATEMENT OF ANDREW NATSIOS, DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF FOREIGN DISASTER ASSISTANCE

Mr. NATSIOS. Are you most interested in the Sudan, the Kurds or the situation in Africa generally?

Mr. DORGAN. Both.

Mr. NATSIOS. Both? All three?

Mr. DORGAN. All three.

Mr. NATSIOS. Right now there are about 33 to 35 million people who face imminent risk of starvation in Africa in 6 different country emergencies.

Mr. DORGAN. How many million?

Mr. NATSIOS. Thirty-three to 35 million people.

Mr. DORGAN. Who face the what?

Mr. NATSIOS. They face the risk of starvation during this year in six countries: Mozambique, Angola, Liberia, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Somalia.

The emergency in Sudan is the most severe in terms of the numbers as a proportion of the population and in terms of the affected logistical and political impediments to the relief program. There are about 11 million people who are at risk in the Sudan right now, which is about 40 percent of the population of the country.

There is no doubt in my mind that there is starvation of thousands of people going on in Sudan as we speak. Beyond that, we don't know because some areas are inaccessible and it is very difficult to make an absolute determination because of the civil war.

I might also say, in those particular countries, the relief effort—or, I should say, the famine is complicated enormously by the existence of the civil war in each case.

In fact, we see that the four horsemen of the apocalypse work together in tandem. And, in particular, in Africa, famine and civil war go arm in arm.

If there is simply a drought, as there is, for example, in Botswana right now or in South Africa, that could be dealt with without a famine developing, which causes people to die.

The drought does not mean, necessarily, that people will die, even in a rural area that has low income and is underdeveloped. It is only when drought is combined with a civil war or conflict situation that famine takes place.

In Sudan, about 11 million people are at risk and the food deficit is 1.2 million tons of food. That's an enormous amount of food.

Our problems in the country are complicated by the civil war, and also by the Government of Sudan's failure to grant visas for relief workers to enter the country or to issue travel permits to get into the countryside. Most particularly, however, we have had trouble with the Sudanese government's not letting the U.N. umbrella program, referred to as Operation Lifeline Sudan, to function adequately in the central and southern parts of the country.

Right now there are very few relief shipments going anywhere into the south except for those that we move in through Kenya outside the U.N. system.

The Government of Sudan has been able to ground the U.N. system, because of inadequacies in the way that the United Nations deals with these emergencies. These inadequacies are built into and are inherent in their charter and their mandates, which constrain them from responding adequately.

The situation in Ethiopia is as complicated. Militarily, Ethiopia seems to be more dynamic; we don't see the same stalemate that we find in Sudan.

In Ethiopia, we believe 5 to 6 million people are at risk and the food deficit is around 750,000 tons of food. There are an additional 150,000 tons required now as a result of hundreds of thousands of Somali refugees and returning Ethiopians moving across the Somalian border into Ethiopia in response to the civil war in Somalia.

In Somalia, the situation is probably one of the worst just in terms of the complete collapse of central governmental authority. As you know, there has been a civil war there for many years, which led to the departure of President Barre this past January. There continues to be fighting, without any easy way of dealing with the problem.

The situation is so insecure right now in Mogadishu that we simply cannot get people into the city. As you know, we had to withdraw our embassy personnel. Virtually all of the Western embassies have withdrawn from Somalia now.

The situation in Liberia has stabilized considerably, but there are a million people who are displaced as a result of the civil war. We are optimistic that we're not going to see a large loss of life in Liberia, because the political situation is stabilizing.

The Angolian civil war continues. While we have negotiationed an agreement to begin relief operations under a U.N. umbrella to provide relief to both sides of the conflict, that agreement has had a fitful history since it was signed last September. The political complications and the civil war make it very difficult for the relief effort to continue, but relief is moving as we speak.

We thought the crops were improving in Angola and that the up coming crop would be good, but recent reports suggest there has been an 80 percent crop loss in some of the areas in central and southeastern Angola.

Finally, with respect to Mozambique, there has been, as you know, a civil war there between the government and the Mozambique National Resistance, RENAMO, probably the most brutal and barbaric of all the rebel groups in the world. There does look like some chance of settlement, but I leave the State Department representative to that matter. But, again, the conflict is complicating the relief effort enormously.

There is a drought in Mozambique which is far more serious than anything we have seen in the last few years. That situation remains an emergency as well.

With respect to the Kurdish situation, our office has sent 25 of our relief managers to work in tandem with the military. We are beginning to accept grant proposals from American and European private voluntary organizations, which will be integrated into the relief effort over the next 30 to 60 days and will build a bridge between the purely military effort that began earlier in April to the United Nations' effort which, we would hope, will begin within the next month or two.

Mr. DORGAN. Mr. Natsios, thank you very much. We would like to come back and ask some questions, but I would first like to hear from Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Alison Rosenberg.

Ms. Secretary, we would be happy to include your entire testimony as part of the current record if you would wish to summarize for us. And then I know a number of members, myself included, would like very much to ask some follow-up questions of Mr. Bissell and, especially, Mr. Natsios.

If you would proceed?

STATEMENT OF ALISON ROSENBERG, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE

Ms. ROSENBERG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will summarize, and my comments may overlap a little bit in substance with those already offered by Mr. Bissell and Mr. Natsios. You asked the State Department to focus on a couple of specific questions: one, the State Department role in trying to reduce hunger through diplo-

matic initiatives, negotiating corridors of safe passage and so forth; and second, to discuss the relationship between militarization and hunger in Africa, and posed the question for us whether military spending in African countries should be reduced substantially or to some degree and with that money saved, devote those resources to human resource development. So that's mainly what I'd like to focus on, Mr. Chairman.

Needless to say, we welcome this session because we remain as concerned as you do about the serious food emergencies and the conflicts that persist in Africa.

You have a particular focus on Sudan. So let me discuss that country first, in a little more detail than the other countries. Hunger in Sudan this year is more complicated because it encompasses two problems. Problem one is hunger among the several million southern Sudanese affected by the ongoing civil war and has been with us since at least 1988.

Problem two is a nationwide food gap this year caused by two years of below-average rains, exhaustion of buffer stocks, and a lack of foreign exchange to purchase food abroad.

This year's nationwide emergency was foreseen by donors and the U.N. as early as last August. The Government of Sudan refused at that time to acknowledge the emergency and only in February promised to cooperate with donors in the U.N.

In spite of that, we didn't wait. Even before Sudan requested emergency assistance, we were shipping food. The U.S., as others have mentioned, has committed ourselves to providing 331,000 tons of food, one-third of the estimated need of 1.2 million tons. Some of this food is already in Sudan, en route to the hungry, and more is on the way.

We hope other donors will not only match, but exceed our own contributions and not only pledge those contributions, but to deliver them on time. It's an essential part of what is needed for a worldwide effort to revert the famine that is moving.

Khartoum is now cooperating on northern relief, but is hindering southern relief, as has been mentioned. It has denied permission to the I.C.R.C. to operate in southern Sudan. It suspended U.N. flights and world food program convoys there. We in the U.N. and others are urging Khartoum to resume these vital programs.

Food from the United States and other donors continues to move into some areas of southern Sudan through the N.G.O.'s that operate independently, but it really is imperative that the U.N. operations resume quickly if tragedy is to be diverted.

And I must say that neither the government nor the rebel Sudanese People's Liberation Army, the S.P.L.A., has respected the zones of tranquility set up by Operation Lifeline Sudan. It is clear that each side still favors its own military objectives over the objective of delivering food to the hungry.

While this year's civil war and drought-related hunger problems are immediate concerns, we should remember that Sudan has a permanent food problem. Only the scale is greater this year. Even in a year of normal rainfall, Sudan has a food gap approaching 500,000 tons, according to some estimates, which is normally filled by donor contributions and commercial imports. This gap is caused by high population growth and the ruinous economic policies the

Sudanese governments of the past 20 years have followed. The number is exacerbated by the ongoing civil war, but would exist, sadly, even if peace broke out tomorrow.

I really am struck by the contrast with Mr. Bissell's comments about India. He said: Who would have guessed 20 years ago that India would be not only feeding itself, but would be a net food exporter? Sudan has always been talked about as a potential breadbasket for Africa. Not only are they not serving that role, but they're totally incapable of feeding their own people. It's just a tragedy.

Let me turn to Ethiopia and some other countries quickly, if I might. In Ethiopia, we have spent most of the last 18 months negotiating safe passage arrangements through complex lines of battles, which grow more complex, it seems, with each day, even as we speak.

The administration, the Congress, P.V.O.s, and relief agencies have all played a constructive role. It's been frustrating and, for some, downright dangerous, but rewarding in terms of the success achieved to date.

Plans to deliver food through Massawa, for example, were overturned by the Eritrean attack on that port in February 1990 and by the government's subsequent bombing of the port. We were able to negotiate an alternative route through the Port of Assab.

Attention then returned to Massawa. Many months of laborious effort with the government and the Eritreans resulted in an agreement on a plan for deliveries through that route.

The latest challenge is to arrange for food deliveries through battle lines established by the latest offensive through Sudanese camps in western Ethiopia.

Angola: In June of 1990 U.N.I.T.A. promised the creation of corridors of peace, as they call them, for deliveries of relief commodities in Angola to civilians affected by drought. We welcomed this proposal and immediately began discussions with the Luanda regime, U.N.I.T.A., and the U.N. to seek early implementation of balanced cross-line and cross-border famine relief.

The Luanda Government agreed to ask the U.N. to develop a plan to provide assistance throughout the country. And in August the U.N. presented its plan of operation: the Special Relief Program for Angola, S.R.P.A.

It appealed for over $103 million in donor assistance, including 118,000 tons of food. The U.S. has pledged some $30 million towards relief, including 40,000 tons of food for relief operations of U.S. private voluntary organizations under U.N. auspices.

Once the parties reached agreement with the U.N., S.R.P.A. operations began in early October. In late December the Luanda regime suspended relief operations in response to a U.N.I.T.A. attack on a bridge used by food convoys.

It took considerable high-level diplomatic effort by our government, the U.N., and others to get those deliveries underway again on March 28th. And I must say throughout that saga, it took—when I say high level attention and commitment, I mean there was no lack of an interest at the highest levels on the part of our government.

On the State Department side, we had Secretary Baker interested in this issue and Under Secretaries Kimmitt and McCormack. Assistant Secretary Cohen was involved in working with the U.N., Deputy Assistant Secretary Davidow played a key roll. Andrew Natsios, I think, deserves special commendation for his unwillingness to take "No" for an answer. In any event, we're crossing our fingers.

We continue to monitor the situation in Angola closely because it needs monitoring and to urge both sides to honor the humanitarian principles of the S.R.P.A. and facilitate relief deliveries across battle lines.

In Liberia U.S.-funded relief began early in the Liberian civil war with assistance to refugees in Clte d'Ivoire, Sierra Leone, and Guinea. Later U.S.-funded relief went to territory controlled by Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia, the N.P.F.L.

Since the N.P.F.L. controlled the Port of Buchana, the port selected by Catholic Relief Services for most movements of relief commodities into areas held by Taylor's forces, safe passage was not really an issue in this case.

Food shipments through Monrovia port began after the military forces of the Economic Community of West African states had stabilized the city.

Since the cease-fire went into effect on December 2nd of last year, passage of relief goods, as Andrew has said, has essentially been unimpeded. To date the U.S. has contributed over $127 million to relief for Liberians affected by the conflict. I wish I could say that other donors have contributed their fair share, but this is really not the case.

Let me turn to Mozambique just to say a brief word. There are peace talks going in Rome on the political situation and the war in Mozambique, which has established a partial cease-fire covering the Beira and Limpopo corridors.

The U.S. suggested adding the Tete corridor as another cease-fire zone in order to facilitate food deliveries to Mozambique and refugees in Malawi. Unfortunately, the R.E.N.A.M.O. delegation has rejected this idea, but we're going to persist. We continue diplomatic efforts to get those relief corridors open.

There's an upcoming round of peace talks beginning, I think the 26th or 27th. And we are going to support the idea of safe passage through the Tete corridor under I.C.R.C. auspices.

In Somalia strife continues among many factions. Widespread hunger is reported in some areas of the country, but the relief operations are badly hindered by security and logistical problems. I.C.R.C. relief teams recently withdrew from Berbera and Kismayo because of insecurity.

We in the U.S. have focused on providing emergency relief through the I.C.R.C. And, sadly, we think little can be done until the security situation improves in a significant way and the I.C.R.C. and other relief organizations can get ongoing sustainable programs established.

For our part in political and diplomatic terms, we are very interested in seeing a political process leading to national reconciliation in that country. Outside mediators, we think, such as the O.A.U. and the U.N., could play a constructive role.

We are ready to be helpful in any way that we can, but history has taught us that there needs to be an African impetus to make something credible and sustainable. We are talking with various Somalia groups and with other donor nations actively to try to bring these factions together.

Let me offer a few comments about your second question: the relationship between hunger and conflict in Africa. It's our view that hunger in Africa today is, in large part, the result of internal conflicts which have produced and continue to produce untold human suffering.

The civil wars I have just discussed have displaced millions of innocent civilians, many of whom are now at risk of actual starvation, but it would probably be a mistake to point to arms and the existence of military establishments as the causes of these wars, or at least the sole cause of these wars. The real causes of Africa's civil wars are disputes which in many cases date back to independence or before. For many generations, regional, political, ethnic, and religious differences have driven these conflicts.

For example, arguments over the proper balance between central authority and regional autonomy have split northern and southern Sudanese and Eritreans and other Ethiopian groups for decades.

Unfortunately, in country after country, the disputing parties have resorted to arms and feudal attempts to resolve their differences, differences which could have been and should have been resolved in the political arena. Of course, no one is questioning that arms can play a role in prolonging these conflicts.

In the past massive shipments of Soviet arms to the Government of Ethiopia, for example, may well have promoted an overconfidence in the feasibility of a military solution to that country's civil wars and an ensuing reluctance to explore negotiated solutions. But those arms flows have ceased now, and Ethiopia's wars continue.

In the case of Liberia, none of the parties to the recent civil war was heavily armed. And in 1987, the latest year for which figures are available, the Government of Liberia's defense expenditures represented less than two and a half percent of G.N.P. Yet, the Liberian conflict, we all know, generated hundreds of thousands of refugees, untold mayhem, and death.

The only real solution to African's internal conflicts and to the hunger and suffering they have caused are negotiations between the parties involved, aimed at achieving a peaceful resolution of their disputes.

As events and years of inconclusive bloodshed have demonstrated, the military operation is simply not viable. The U.S. is willing, indeed anxious, to assist in facilitating negotiated solutions to Africa's civil wars whenever we and the African parties believe our participation would be useful.

We supported the efforts of E.C.O.W.A.S., the Economic Community of West African States, to achieve a cease-fire in Liberia and to encourage the Liberian parties to negotiate a peaceful resolution of their political differences. We're providing technical assistance and expertise at the talks between the M.P.L.A. government in Angola and U.N.I.T.A., currently being held under Portuguese auspices.

We're doing the same at the talks between the Government of Mozambique and R.E.N.A.M.O. We have sought to bring the Ethiopian government and the Eritreans to the negotiating table and will continue to do so.

In Sudan we have pointed out to both the government and the insurgent S.P.L.A. that a military solution is not possible and that they should start talking about preconditions.

Not all of our efforts or those of other friends of peace in Africa may bear fruit soon, but we think there is a cause for optimism in the fact that several sets of negotiations are going on at once and that in some cases, particularly in the Angolan talks, notable progress has been made.

I should note here that most African governments do not devote a large portion of their resources to military spending. For example, according to the latest figures available to us, in 1990 Nigeria spent approximately one percent of its G.N.P. on defense; Senegal, two percent in 1989; and Kenya spent one percent that year.

I should also point out that African governments do have legitimate defense responsibilities, as governments elsewhere, including defense of their own frontiers and contributions to international peacekeeping efforts, such as the E.C.O.W.A.S. effort on Liberian war.

Sierra Leone, now facing unprovoked attack from elements of the Liberian N.P.F.L., wouldn't be able to defend itself at all if it had averted military spending in the past. E.C.O.W.A.S. peacekeeping efforts in Liberia, as I mentioned, are based on the presence of military contingents from surrounding member states.

Nor could Senegal, Niger, and Sierra Leone have contributed small, but symbolically important contingents to Operation Desert Storm if they hadn't spent the funds necessary to maintain some viable defense force.

Obviously, African governments should spend more, and for the most part do, on national development than they do on their militaries. Obviously, too, the U.S. should, and does, I'm happy to say, focus its assistance efforts on development.

We have asked for Fiscal '92, for example, $800 million for the development fund for Africa; $28 million in economic support funds, with the lion's share of that small amount going for the support of democratizing or democratic regimes, whose economies are under stress; $147 million in non-emergency food assistance; and $34 million in military aid, which is less than three and a half percent of our total aid request for Africa.

And interestingly as much of that $34 million in military aid, if it's approved, will be used for purposes directly supportive of national development.

Our regional military assistance program, for example, includes a civic action program to help African militaries play a concrete role in development for constructing bridges and hospitals, and a coastal security program to help African countries protect their fisheries resource. We will also assist African militaries in training in peacekeeping techniques, which complements our diplomatic efforts.

We want to encourage, and support the peaceful resolution of Africa's conflicts. And one of the best ways of doing so is to ensure

that capable African peacekeeping forces are available to guarantee the settlements we all hope will emerge.

I hope I haven't taken too much time. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DORGAN. Ms. Rosenberg, thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Rosenberg appears at the conclusion of the hearing, see p. 80.]

Mr. DORGAN. Let me just ask Mr. Natsios and others of you what you estimate is going to happen in the short and intermediate terms. The assessment that 35 million people are at risk of starvation, Mr. Natsios, in your testimony is a very depressing assessment of where we are.

And we have seen most recently, in this year and part of last year, an international mobilization of countries in an effort to achieve an objective, perhaps an unprecedented mobilization of countries, to achieve a specific objective. We see now in the hills of Iraq another mobilization to respond to a specific tragedy that's occurring.

Is there the potential of the same kind of mobilization of will among the countries of the world to respond to the threat of starvation of millions of people in the Horn of Africa? And is that underway? Or is there a radical difference between what is happening to mobilize to respond to something that the eye of the television camera has sent into all of our living rooms in the hills of Iraq in a manner that wouldn't allow any of us to say we don't care, versus the hunger that exists now and the winds of starvation that blow now in Africa, probably creating much greater risk for millions of people? Is there a substantial difference in what's going on to address those two issues, Mr. Natsios?

Mr. NATSIOS. In terms of describing the difference between what we see on the border in Turkey and what we see in Africa, the famines we have facing us in Africa we have known about for six months because of our remote sensing devices.

We use satellites to take images of the ground that tell us whether the ground cover is the right color for the time of year. That will indicate to us whether the crops are failing or not. So we have some warnings.

Then we send teams out to look at the crops on the ground to confirm the satellite imagery. We can then build up a cadre of PVO's and relief structures, and negotiated agreements with the governments over a period of time, as we have done in each of those countries except Somalia. That's the only place where that is almost impossible to do because there's no one to negotiate with at this point.

The problem on the Turkish border is an extraordinary one in that we saw every possible thing that could happen to a refugee population take place within a week or two, which is to say: They brought no food with them. They brought no water with them, and there weren't any of these things where they went. The refugees had no shelter. The sanitary facilities were horrendous.

They went into an area on the side of a mountain, where it was raining and cold and is logistically impossible to get to. This is the reason we're now moving them down into the valleys below now.

The Kurds just had an uprising that was brutally suppressed by the central government. The Turkish government does not want

any more Kurds than they already have had to come over their border. So there is a political problem in Turkey, in addition to the political problem in Iraq itself.

Moreover, the speed with which this happened was unprecedented and the size of the refugee population is just enormous. There are a million people in Iran, another 400,000 are in Turkey, and another 450,000 we think—but we're not certain at this point—are still in Iraq on the border with Turkey.

To have that many people move within a week is extraordinary. In addition to that, these people are urban dwellers. If a rural African peasant, a nomad or a farmer is in a famine situation, they have ways of coping because they have dealt with this before. They can go to a neighbor and try to get support from them.

That's what happened in Liberia. Liberians went to their relatives over the border to get assistance from them. They sell their animal populations gradually. They sell their farm implements gradually. And they can survive. The people are much tougher in the rural areas because they have been through this before.

The people on the Turkish border were primarily middle class people who were urban dwellers. They had no coping mechanisms at all.

The risk to the population in the immediate future was much greater at the Turkish border than it is in Africa because of the nature of the emergency. One was a famine, in which things gradually deteriorate. In the other, there was no food at all over a very short period of time.

With respect to Africa, we have not changed any of the budgets we put together or the funding or the food commitments for these famines.

While, clearly, the news media's attention is on the Turkish border, I have had a number of employees come to see me lately who said, perhaps with a sense of guilt, that we're not focusing our attention on some larger emergencies; for example, Sudan.

While the media's focus does certainly affect what I have to do in terms of talking to them, it does not affect how our resources are allocated. It hasn't, and it won't. We know where the magnitude of the problem is, and that's where we put our resources.

Mr. DORGAN. Yes. But your resource allocation is only part of the resources——

Mr. NATSIOS. Oh, yes.

Mr. DORGAN. Necessary to respond to this. And I guess one of my contentions has been that the enormous response—and I credit the President and others for doing this—in the hills of Iraq largely comes as a result of enormous publicity, putting those people, those desperate people, under the microscope of a television camera and showing the rest of the world. And the rest of the world says, "We can't, we don't care. We can't turn it off. We've got to do something," and demanding that governments do something. And the governments do something to the point of saying, "The sovereign borders are irrelevant to us. We're going to save these people."

And I guess the question I'm asking is: Are there conditions in which if we're going to lose three million people to starvation in the Horn of Africa and the governments don't cooperate and the

groups are out there fighting each other, that a group of countries would mobilize to say, "We will not let this happen"?

Mr. NATSIOS. There are two differences, I think. One difference is that we have a lot more political leverage with the Kurdish situation as it is right now than we have in many of these countries in Africa.

For example, there are very few governments that have a good relationship with Sudan. Iraq is one of them. Another is Yemen. Another is Libya. Those are the only countries that have any leverage with Sudan. The Saudis used to, but since Sudan was largely supportive of Iraq, the Saudis are, of course, furious about that and have suspended aid and therefore have very little influence left in Sudan.

So the question is whether the political situation will allow us to do anything. The fact is that, because of our military presence and what happened in the Gulf War, our ability to act at the border with Turkey, Turkey being an ally of ours, is much greater than it is in some of the African emergencies.

The second thing in Africa that's a big problem is the guerrilla forces in many but not all of these countries. I'm not going to specify which counties are in which category. It would get me into political trouble. Of these guerrilla forces, half of them are not disciplined. They're just young men with guns who are living off the bush.

One of the officers in our office commented that it beats the minimum wage in rural Africa to have a gun and go out and live with it. Half of what we call guerrilla forces are just undisciplined young men out in the countryside making their living of the villagers. That is the cause of some of the violence we've seen.

It's a particular problem in Mozambique. The leadership orders something to happen in some areas, and nothing happens because they don't have control over those men.

That complicates any diplomatic negotiations. Even military operations are very difficult. You develop a cease-fire agreement, and half the people don't conform to it.

Mr. DORGAN. You indicated that 35 million people are at risk of starvation. I mean, is that almost an unprecedented number? That's such a depressing report. It's hard for me to respond to it.

Mr. NATSIOS. Yes. It's depressing to me, too.

Mr. DORGAN. Is that growing rapidly as a result of the drought and the war and the stress in the Horn of Africa?

Mr. NATSIOS. There are a number of reasons for it. It's very clear to me that one of the principal problems, even given the political instability in these countries, is the regressive agricultural policies.

I'll give you one very striking example of what can happen. In Ethiopia last year, when Mengistu gave his very famous speech to the party congress, essentially saying "We're not a Marxist country any more. We're going to give the peasants back their land," the peasants took the matter into their own hands. They carried out Mengistu's speech without any central government direction.

An extraordinary 80 percent of the land now in Ethiopia is in private hands. It was just forcibly taken by the peasantry, and the government couldn't stop it because their troops were otherwise occupied.

The increase in agricultural production in the 11 provinces of Ethiopia that are unaffected by the drought or the war was 15 percent over last year. It's not because of better rains or better fertilizers; it is because the peasants own their own land and they produce more food.

In the whole country, as a whole, there has been a five percent increase, even given the drought that has taken place in these four very heavily hit provinces.

They have been losing food production, or have had a reduced level of food production, every year in Ethiopia for the last 15 years because of regressive agriculture policies.

My point is that these problems can be dealt with, but there needs to be sound macroeconomic reforms in the food and agricultural sectors.

Mr. DORGAN. Let me just for one more minute pursue this. We were told by some testimony a while back that if everything worked fairly well, if everything went right in the efforts to aid the people of Sudan, there would likely still be 300,000 people die in the coming couple of months.

That's if things worked well, we'd have 300,000 people starve to death. If things don't work well,—and often they don't—the death toll is going to be much, much higher than that.

Can you respond to that?

Mr. NATSIOS. I can't tell you. Anybody who says they can pinpoint exactly how many people are going to die——

Mr. DORGAN. Well, it was an estimate.

Mr. NATSIOS. We can't even count them. I'll tell you honestly that the figures we have for how many people die are really very much ballpark figures.

We don't really know how many Ethiopians died in 1984. We don't know for sure that a quarter of a million Sudanese died in 1987-88 in the famine there.

We think, by extrapolating figures, that the number who died is somewhere in that neighborhood. But no one counts the bodies. They die very quiet deaths. Some of them are terrible deaths, alone in the rural areas. They just drop. Most of the deaths occur on the way to get food in the relief camp. We don't know.

In Sudan this year, I think there are going to be hundreds of thousands of deaths, but we will never know for sure how many die because you can't get out there and count.

Mr. DORGAN. Do you view this as a crisis?

Mr. NATSIOS. In Sudan, it's absolutely a crisis.

Mr. DORGAN. Are we mobilized, and have we worked with our allies to mobilize, in a manner that would recognize this as a crisis, in your deference?

Mr. NATSIOS. One of the things we initiated last December was a series of discussions with the European Economic Community, or E.C., to see what they were doing.

We haven't done this in an intense way with the Europeans. We consult with them occasionally. We had a delegation of senior-level A.I.D. people go to Europe to meet bilaterally with the British, the Dutch, the Germans, and then with the E.C. people to coordinate on how much we would contribute and to encourage them to give more.

We have contributed, as a general rule, about a third of the emergency requirement. We hope that the European Community, as a generality, would give another third. And then the last third would be given by the Canadians the British and others bilaterally.

Mr. DORGAN. You know, Secretary Baker has been remarkable in his ability to apply the right kind of leverage at the right time in the right countries to achieve the right objective.

Is that same effort underway at those levels with respect to attempting to get our allies to produce the kind of assistance that's necessary in the areas that are——

Mr. NATSIOS. As I said, the delegation went over and met with European officials. The head of the A.I.D. equivalent in Britain, Mrs. Chalker, visited with us two weeks ago. We have coordinated our planning on that subject.

The big problem at this point, Mr. Chairman, is that the logistical problems are insurmountable in parts of Sudan, even if we had all the food sitting in Port Sudan right now.

Mr. DORGAN. I understand that, but there's a significant shortage of food because the donor countries are making their donations.

Mr. NATSIOS. Absolutely. That's right.

Mr. DORGAN. Mrs. Secretary Rosenberg, is the Secretary of State viewing this as a crisis and doing what he can do to achieve the results we know he can achieve in other areas?

Ms. ROSENBERG. The Secretary has been involved on more than one occasion in personal meetings and communicating, as far masters do, by cables and so forth, when they're each in their respective capitals, on this very problem. And there was a heavy leaning on the other donors fairly recently.

When the Secretary is not there, Sudan continues to be a front-burner issue,—I can say that—maybe not front-page issue, but a front-burner issue in the State Department continually. We never have any problem getting the State Department fully activated when we think now is a good time.

You know, we had a problem during the Gulf War because U.S. personnel were being withdrawn. It was a very wrenching decision to have to make. And, finally, you know, the security of American personnel had to be the first priority.

And we were hoping that was already in progress, an enhanced role for the World Food Program and others, could be a kind of stopgap way of dealing with the situation.

We're very happy that we're gearing up again now in the Sudan. And, quite frankly, other donors look to the United States for all kinds of signals. So even our presence there, our renewed presence there, I think, has already caused at least a lot of talk about pledges from the European Community.

I think our figures vary a little bit, the reporting that we've gotten so far, but it seems to me there's a reasonable prospect that the E.C. will at least match what the U.S. contribution will be. But what we need to do now is to nail those things down and make sure they not only pledge it, but that they get it there in time because there is no time to waste whatsoever. But, as I say, it continue to be a priority.

Assistant Secretary Cohen is traveling in Africa right now. He's heavily involved in the Angolan negotiations, among other things.

But he has made trips to the U.N. as well to push that part of the process.

We work with Mr. Bolton in the Bureau to try to, in other words, work on all fronts. The working assumption there is you can't count on any one thing to be a panacea because, even as others have said and as you have said, all the machinery is working, and there is going to be a problem.

We want to minimize the risk that there will be a problem because we haven't done something.

Mr. DORGAN. Members of this task force have been to the U.N. as well to discuss with Secretary General de Cuellar the problems.

But again, this demands it seems to me, significant leadership from our country. And I recall the shuttled diplomacy back and forth and the techniques used to wedge certain concessions here and there to achieve objectives in the Persian Gulf.

It's critical that this country responds to the threat of 35 million people starving in Africa as well. There are many different kinds of invasions in this world that we feel compelled to respond to.

One invasion that is a human tragedy is the invasion of hunger that threatens to obliterate millions of people, and it's an invasion we can do something about, not easily, but it's an invasion we can and must do something about. And our country must continue to provide leadership in that area.

Let me call on Mr. Penny.

Mr. PENNY. Thank you.

Ms. Rosenberg, could you give me some idea of what role former Senator Boschwitz is to play as he travels to Ethiopia on behalf of the Bush Administration?

Ms. ROSENBERG. Mr. Penny, that trip was entrain. You're probably asking in connection with recent announcements coming out of Ethiopia that some kind of transition plan and negotiated settlement are being promoted by the government right now in Ethiopia.

Frankly, the plans for former Senator Boschwitz's trip predated that announcement. And I think high on his priority list was the issue of the Falashas, which is a priority for this administration.

I have no doubt that while he is there, other issues are going to be raised. We are a little cautious in commenting on the sum and substance in detail of a proposal. We think anything that is talking about peace and initial reconciliation, instead of just pursuing a war, is good news.

If it appears that Senator Boschwitz is asked to play a constructive role or a request is made to him and through him to the U.S. government as a whole to play a helpful role, we're certainly open to hearing what they have to say.

So my guess is—you know, I'm not speaking for management here. My guess is they're going to talk about more than Falashas. We think the Falashas is worth a trip by itself, but given the coincidence——

Mr. PENNY. And that was the original purpose?

Ms. ROSENBERG. That's right. That's right. Originally there was no announcement of any kind of reconciliation plan at all. It's something we all hoped could emerge, but it's a coincidence now of events that——

Mr. PENNY. Let me move from the specific to the general. What more should the world community do to involve itself in settling these civil disputes, disputes that lead to bloodshed and in so many cases in Africa lead to disruption and the complication in meeting the basic needs of the people of that nation?

Ms. ROSENBERG. Your question goes to what role the American citizen, the average American citizen, can play?

Mr. PENNY. Well, no. The international community.

Ms. ROSENBERG. Yes.

Mr. PENNY. And I would say the leading nations, like the U.S.——

Ms. ROSENBERG. Yes.

Mr. PENNY. But nations collectively, as expressed through the U.N. What more should we do to settle these disputes, to stop these wars so that they don't—not only to save the lives that are lost in these conflicts, but also save the many, many lives that have been jeopardized when famine develops and then the military stands in the way, on one side of the other, military stands in the way of a solution to those hunger problems?

Ms. ROSENBERG. That's a good question. I think that the answer is that there was a role for everyone to play and kind of a division of labor and then a time for everyone to come together. That's why I've mentioned that Ethiopia or the Sudan have taken the Executive Branch efforts, the Congress, the international donors, and so forth.

Now, I think it's at least as—the question of contributing "X" amount of metrics tons aside, you're getting to something more fundamental than that.

Mr. PENNY. My question is: What good does that do if you've got the efforts exacerbated by a conflict in which one side or the other is stopping the flow of those supplies or a civil war that's been driving people off the land so an entire crop year of production is lost?

Ms. ROSENBERG. I think we have to keep sending the message that the United States believes that these conflicts are not going to be settled on the battlefield.

And we are interested, and we have provided arms in various conflicts for various reasons at various times, as well as others. We want to get out of that business.

We think it's an auspicious time with regard to Soviet policy, that they are also interested in getting out of the business of——

Mr. PENNY. Picking one side?

Ms. ROSENBERG. Just whatever role they're playing in keeping the conflict going. As I mentioned before, I don't think that's going to solve the problem overnight, but that goes a long way.

We need to keep pushing the democratic ideal, if you will, point out that the whole world, whole rest of the world, is changing and that things are moving in the direction of political openness and away from wars. And that's where Africa needs to be going to.

We are not going to play politics with food relief. We're going to make that clear, too. And if the government, the host government, has a problem, then we'll just figure out all kinds of ways to make them see reason; if we have to, go around them, which is a little bit of both in this case in the Sudan. In other cases it's something else.

Mr. PENNY. Yes. I did want to get to the point of going around them and perhaps doing it a lot more often than we have in the past. It seems to me that we're blinded by sovereignty when it comes to basic human rights and human life.

Mr. NATSIOS. Might I, Congressman? With respect to the African emergencies, we don't worry about that. We go in, and we deliver the food. We're doing it right now in Sudan.

Mr. PENNY. I understand.

Mr. NATSIOS. The difficulty is that, in many cases for example, in northern Sudan, there is no other way. If the government does not cooperate in the northern area of the country in delivering food, we cannot deliver it to Libya or Egypt because there just is no way to do it logistically. We have to deliver food through Port Sudan for the north or it can't be done.

So, in some cases, it's not a matter of violating sovereignty. I mean, if a government doesn't want us to deliver food to the poor, they physically can stop us from doing that.

Mr. PENNY. Yes. But we are complicated by that resistance. And we are also——

Mr. NATSIOS. Yes. I don't want to go into great detail. We do lots of things. The committee knows it, I'm sure, because we have closed sessions sometimes.

We go across borders to deliver food without the approval of some governments. I'll just make it as a general statement.

The only time we let sovereignty stand in the way of a relief effort is when we physically can't provide assistance without the government's approval. That does happen occasionally if the population is in an area where there is no other alternative but to negotiate with the government. That's where we have serious complications.

Mr. PENNY. Let me move beyond the relief efforts to the civil unrest, civil wars do so often complicate these relief efforts and what we ought to be willing to do to resolve those issues.

You know, my idea of a new world order is to take the lead. And we certainly did that in the Gulf. There would not have been a military response to Saddam Hussein's aggression if the United States had not led the coalition and in some ways just pulled them along to share their part of the load in that effort.

Now that the war has ended, even though it was a few weeks too late, we are leading the world in really an unprecedented involvement of the military in securing safe havens for refugees in northern Iraq, contrary to the will of the Iraqi government. So we have stepped around sovereignty to say people's needs come first. And the Iraqi government cannot be trusted to protect these people. In fact, the Iraqi government is directly responsible for their status.

I look at the effect of civil unrest around the globe as a very serious problem that too often we feel constrained to address. And it's because we don't want to take it that extra step of stepping in and imposing on an international basis some kind of cease-fire, enforcement of that cease-fire, and a forced negotiation, if necessary.

As long as it's a war within a country, it's not a major concern to us unless it has some ideological East-West component. Which is diminishing. I acknowledge that.

But just because the Soviet Union is stepping out doesn't mean that these civil wars are going to fall by the boards. They will continue. They are a human tragedy. And just because they happen within the sovereign boundaries of a nation doesn't mean that the rest of the world doesn't have an interest in saving lives.

So I guess what I'm trying to get at is: If the U.S. has established a new world order in the Persian Gulf by taking a stand against aggression and leading a military coalition to stop that aggression, what can the U.S. do to take the lead in stopping these civil wars and leading a world coalition to bring an end to this kind of bloodshed, to bring peace to these nations, and to make it more possible for us to provide relief to those who need it, but, more fundamentally, to provide stable environments so that they don't have famines and massive starvation in these nations?

Ms. ROSENBERG. Well, those are good questions, Mr. Penny, and you've got several there.

I'm very proud of our record in terms of our being in the lead in food relief, but I also think we've got a good story to tell in terms of diplomatic leadership in a number of these conflicts in Africa.

I summarized them in my opening statement, but I think wherever there has been any kind of prospect at all to do something, we've got talks. We took that opportunity and are either led or are supporting in a way that, frankly, amounts to moral leadership in a number of these talks.

We're trying to probe for opportunities in the more intractable situation in Somalia and maddening situation in Sudan, where there is no party that seems on a consistent basis to be interested in any kind of diplomatic solution.

When you take an issue to the U.N., you really need at least one of the victims or one of the parties involved in the conflict to ask for that kind of thing. It is not something that the U.N. would respond to if the U.S. went itself.

Mr. PENNY. Although the U.N.—okay.

Ms. ROSENBERG. Yes.

Mr. PENNY. You know, Kuwait alone I don't think would have gotten the U.N. to do a heck of a lot.

Ms. ROSENBERG. But I'm just saying no——

Mr. PENNY. The U.S. made that happen.

Ms. ROSENBERG. In the current conference we're talking——

Mr. PENNY. The same thing is true here. If the U.S. walked into the U.N. on behalf of the Kurds and said, "Would you get the P.V.O.'s, the N.G.O.'s some cover in northern Iraq by saying it's okay for us to step in, with military personnel, if necessary, to provide safety for these refugees," you know, that then would make that effort more meaningful. It would allow the groups that have resources to come into play in these safe havens to provide assistance.

And right now there is a lot of resistance to do that because what we have done is unprecedented. Certainly we're saving lives. We're providing protection. But we've got a lot of private groups hanging back because they're not comfortable with us coming inside the borders of Iraq.

If the U.N., led by the U.S., would pass a resolution saying this is appropriate and this is sanctioned, I think that we would set the

kind of precedent that might have some value in other places around the globe.

Ms. ROSENBERG. Again, I think the U.N. resolutions, even those that were passed prior to this Kurdish problem arising so dramatically and so quickly, gave a legal basis for a unilateral military involvement in this way.

Again, we also have said that we view it as temporary in the sense that we want to be there as long as we're needed, but we think it's really the U.N. machinery that needs to get entrain. And so we're filling a gap in a sense.

If we can help make—if security is a problem or safe passage is a problem in those relief programs in Africa, you know, we want to be helpful in making sure that they're successful in——

Mr. PENNY. Well, there's got to be a new world order, and somebody's continually got to take the lead.

Ms. ROSENBERG. Well, I think that——

Mr. PENNY. We have done that in leading the effort to free Kuwait. We're doing that to a far lesser degree in the effort to save the Kurds. And I don't know who else is going to do it.

I agree with you that the world community has to get some umbrella to these efforts, but somebody has got to take the lead in the U.N. And if now us, who?

Mr. NATSIOS. May I just add a bit of perspective from a relief point of view? We are involved on a daily basis with the State Department, with Alison Rosenberg and Hank Cohen, on these issues.

Hank Cohen has said, for the two years that I've watched him, that the two principal goals of American foreign policy in Africa are humanitarian relief and the ending of civil conflict. He says that all the time, and he has done precisely that. If you look at the time he spends on those issues, versus other issues, that is the great bulk of his time.

We talk weekly on the issues that come up in some of the civil wars where there is a relief effort, where the relief effort might facilitate the peace talks. That happens all the time.

We are developing a new doctrine of dealing with relief as it relates to peace because the two can be related. We can, in fact, increase the chance for peace agreements by using relief not as a lever, but as an opening discussion in terms of negotiations, of getting some early success, of getting the sides to talk to each other, and of achieving some minimal agreement to get relief food. That is a base on which, in several of these civil wars, a political settlement is now being built.

That is the first time that has happened, so far as I know, anywhere in the world by any nation. We haven't done that before in the United States in an intimate way, and it is a relationship scholars are beginning to look at now to make the connection.

I should say that, in some of these countries, the diplomatic effort is just as intense as it is in the Middle East, but no one cares about it in terms of the public or the media because it's not on the front page. American interests aren't seen to be directly at risk.

The level of activity is intense by the United States in the United Nations, in our office, in the State Department, by Hank Cohen himself, and by the Secretary. The first order issued by Sec-

retary Baker when he became Secretary of State, was on Sudan. That is not widely understood.

He said, "I do not want another repetition of the Sudanese famine" that took place a couple of years before where so many people died. He issued a policy statement on it publicly. He gave us very clear instructions.

I think just because it's not in the papers doesn't mean that a lot of things aren't going on.

Ms. ROSENBERG. Just one further—I don't want to belabor this, Mr. Penny, but I was thinking about the implications of the Iraq Kurdish situation for Africa.

The fact that there's talk now about negotiation between the Kurds and the Iraqi government—I'm not an expert on the politics and I don't know whether what's being talked about is a good deal or not, but the fact that negotiations seem to be alive in some way that they weren't before I think has important implications for Africa as well. It's one thing to gear up machinery to deal with an emergency, but you have to get at those underlying longstanding issues.

And in the case of Iraq and the Kurds, you know, maybe it's the case that both sides have just come to the conclusion they have to deal with each other in some way.

That's the kind of message we're trying to give to Africa as well.

Mr. PENNY. I suspect, though, it's because we're still there.

Ms. ROSENBERG. Well, that has been a helpful message, but, you know, as I say, if we can be helpful in bolstering the U.N., whatever it takes. But I think, for the most part, we've got those agreements on safe passage. In some cases, the implementation has been spotty.

I'm not sure whether that argues for unilateral military intervention in southern Sudan.

Mr. PENNY. And if I might just make one last remark in response to Mr. Natsios?

I appreciate your comments about Secretary Baker's emphasis on the Sudan, but we're right back where we started.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DORGAN. Thank you, Mr. Penny.

I'd like to submit a couple of questions for the record, and ask that you respond, Mr. Bissell, with respect to children survival funds in Africa and what appears to be a proposed decrease.

I want to thank all of you for some very interesting and useful statements presented to us today, and we appreciate your willingness to spend an hour and a half with us. Thank you very much.

Mr. BISSELL. Thank you.

Mr. DORGAN. Next we would like to hear from Art Simon, President of Bread for the World, and from Mr. John Swenson, Deputy Executive Director of Catholic Relief Services.

If you two gentlemen would come forward, we would appreciate it. Mr. Simon and Mr. Swenson, you have provided the committee with statements, which we have had the opportunity to review. We would ask that your statements be a part of the record and that you summarize for purposes of this testimony.

We very much appreciate your willingness to come today and appreciate your patience as you have listened to testimony that you likely have found as interesting as we have found.

Mr. Simon, you may proceed.

STATEMENT OF ART SIMON, PRESIDENT OF BREAD FOR THE WORLD; ACCOMPANIED BY JOHN SWENSON, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES

Mr. SIMON. Thank you very, very much. It didn't take any patience at all. I was fascinated with the testimony. And I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman and the entire task force, for the opportunity to testify here.

I have in my written testimony that I won't even summarize listed six conclusions that are drawn from the first of what will be an annual series of reports on world hunger published by Bread for the World Institute on hunger and development last October, this one entitled "Hunger 1990."

But the first of those six conclusions, which are listed on Page 2 of my printed testimony, is that militarization is a primary cause of hunger. And that's the point that I would like to elaborate on in my oral testimony this morning.

Basically, the links between hunger and militarization are three. The first is that the strengthening of military forces often leads to military rule and/or tighter control over a society by a ruling elite, making it more difficult for people to participate freely in efforts to work their way out of hunger and poverty.

A second link is that conflict, when it does erupt, wrecks economies and typically, in the Third World especially, brings poverty and famine in its wake.

And a third link is that even when weapons are not used, when conflict does not break out, the cost of arms destroys life because it deprives people of food and other basic needs.

Worldwide military spending is almost one trillion dollars a year. And that exceeds the total annual income of the poorest half of the world's population.

Now, the good news is that with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of communism, the world has an unparalleled opportunity to end the arms race and redirect resources toward peaceful development.

Now, unfortunately, the Gulf crisis seems to be breathing new life into the arms race. And I think that is most ironic because if ever there was a lesson to be learned from that crisis, it is the folly of having poured tens of billions of dollars of armaments into that volatile region of the world.

Now I would like to turn to the Horn of Africa because one of the problems with our preoccupation with the Gulf crisis is that it has diverted attention and resources from other areas of need.

A striking example of this and a striking example of the link between militarization and hunger, as we have just heard from the previous witnesses, is the Horn of Africa, which if you look at the globe, it is barely a stone's throw away from Iraq and just a few miles across the Red Sea from Saudi Arabia.

There in Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia, as you have said, Mr. Chairman, 21 million people are at risk of starvation. So while the world's attention is riveted on the Kurds, as well it should be, a more massive tragedy unfolds nearby and goes largely unnoticed.

According to the most recent report from the U.N. Food and Agricultural Organization, the situation in Sudan, especially, is deteriorating rapidly.

"Deaths from starvation and large scale population movements in search of food are reported from many areas." I'm quoting the F.A.O. here. "Grain prices have increased drastically and are beyond the purchasing power of large section so the population. Donor pledges and deliveries fall well short of the minimum needs of the affected population. Only a massive international relief effort can avert further human suffering and loss of life."

And, Mr. Chairman, just yesterday I received from World Vision a fax from News Vision, a news service based in London, and I would like to quote that because I've not been able to confirm this independently, but I think it should be of interest to this task force and to the House Select Committee as a whole.

The news release says, "Our contacts in Sudan tell us that the government there has announced plans to force up to one million displaced people to leave Khartoum and return to their homes in rural areas.

"If the plan comes to fruition, it will be the largest forced exodus of people since Pol Pot evacuated Pnom Penh in 1975. The government says it will press ahead without delay.

"Because of the Sudanese ban on foreign journalists visiting the country, the issue is likely to go largely unnoticed." All of that is a quote from the news release, and it is certainly a situation that should be determined as rapidly as possible: Is that accurate or is it not?

Well, the question is: What can the United States do about the crisis on the Horn? Emergency relief is the most obvious immediate answer. And I want to say in connection with this and with other steps that I think are needed that a lot of credit does have to go to the State Department.

I think the U.S. government has in many respects been forthcoming, and I am convinced that Assistant Secretary Cohen and others that we have heard from here at the State Department have got their hearts and heads in the right places. I do think, though, that we can do more.

The latest estimate from the World Food Program in terms of the total food needs in Sudan indicates that we are 1.6 million tons short. And so far the U.S. pledge is 246 million tons, with an indication that the pledge could reach a total of 330,000.

Now, if we followed a formula, rough ballpark, one-third of the total need should come from the U.S., in this case that would be about 534,000 tons, which is far more than what has been pledged or that is, at least, indicated as a likely pledge.

So do we have more to do than we have done so far? Yes. I think the answer is very clear to that. But beyond emergency relief, what can we do? Because if we do nothing but emergency relief, we're just going to see recurrent famines. We've got to break that pat-

tern. We've got in some fashion to move toward long-term recovery.

What would it take to do that? I think the first and most important step is to press vigorously for peace. And we have heard testimony on that already.

Could we do more to press for peace? I think the answer is yes. One of the witnesses said a bit ago that the response of the State Department would be the same regardless of media attention. I, frankly, question whether that is the case.

Clearly, press attention to the plight of the Kurds had a great deal to do with the way in which the administration suddenly found ways to move in aggressively and do something. And it seems to me the same could be true here.

We've got to rally other nations behind the effort. I think we've got to use the U.N. to play a much more vigorous role than it has played so far. More can be done.

A second step is to press vigorously for safe passage of relief supplies, the corridors of tranquility. Again, it illustrates the point I just made.

The Operation Lifeline Sudan worked. It came about, and it worked for a while because it had very high-level leadership from the U.N. in the person of Jim Grant, the head of Unicef.

And the reports we get are that it probably isn't going to work unless the same kind of high-level leadership again comes into play there. It seems to me that the U.S. could push for that to happen.

The third step that needs to occur, with or without safe passage, is to get assistance to those who need it through these cross-border back-door operations. Again, our reports say more could be done than is currently being done.

A fourth essential step is to offer direct longer-term development assistance to both U.S.-based and indigenous nongovernmental organizations that have been working effectively at the local level and have shown ability to stimulate recovery through participatory, sustainable development. Ultimately, the people themselves are the ones that can bring this about, and our efforts should strengthen their capacity to do so.

Now, I'm pleased to say that the principals and initiatives that I have suggested here briefly are all part of the Horn of Africa Recovery and Food Security Act that you have mentioned, Mr. Chairman, and that you have introduced with your colleagues on this task force, Representatives Wheat, Bereuter, and Emerson as chief sponsors, and with your colleagues on both sides of the aisle, who have come in as initial sponsors of that legislation. I think it is absolutely crucial that this legislation be enacted as soon as possible in the strongest possible form.

Now, the rest of my testimony I will not try to summarize. I do have some suggestions for strategies against hunger, some under the category of short-term interventions.

And here the Freedom From Want of 1991 that is soon to be introduced and the related World Summit for Children Implementation Act of 1991 that has been introduced, the first under leadership of the Chairman of the House Select Committee Tony Hall and the second by Mr. McQue, illustrate in a number of key provisions what could be done through some short-time and relatively

inexpensive interventions, such as child survival efforts and full and complete funding for the W.I.C. program here domestically.

Then I have a section on long-term interventions. And here I'm talking more about structural changes that need to be made, everything from jobs to the problem of indebtedness and trade, opportunities for developing countries, and revamping of the U.S. Foreign Aid Program.

One of the previous witnesses, I believe it was—or it may have been one of the members of the task force—referred to the goal of the 1974 world food conference that was in a decade no child should go that hungry. It was interesting that it was Secretary of State Henry Kissinger who put that goal before the Congress and in doing so said because for the first time in history, we have the capability of overcoming hunger, therefore, if we do not meet this goal, tragedy will result from failure of will. And I think he was quite right.

There's a lot we need to learn yet about overcoming hunger, but, basically, lack of understanding or lack of technology is not the problem. The problem is lack of will. We've just got to begin doing something to get from here to there.

We are a human family. We can all contribute to what gets put on the table in one way or another, but there should be a place at the table for everybody as well.

Mr. DORGAN. Mr. Simon, thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Art Simon appears at the conclusion of the hearing, see p. 88.]

Mr. DORGAN. Next we'll hear from Mr. John Swenson. Mr. Swenson?

STATEMENT OF JOHN SWENSON, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES

Mr. SWENSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We appreciate the opportunity to testify. And I would like to say, not for the first time, we very much appreciate the leadership role that this task force and the full committee have taken in the years since it was formed to bring so much attention and thought to the issues of global hunger. We appreciate the leadership that the committee has shown.

I will try to be brief, Mr. Chairman. Much of what we have to say is contained in the testimony, which you have indicated will be included in the record.

And I will give most of my time, as I think the committee wishes, to the situation in the Sudan and, indeed, in any other area, including Liberia, Angola, Ethiopia, that the committee may have an interest in.

Let me just start with a couple of general remarks. In their pastoral statement of a couple of years ago, called "Economic Justice for All," the Catholic bishops of this country pointed out that the misery of the poor in low-income countries is not the "inevitable result of the march of history or of the intrinsic nature of particular cultures, but of human decisions and human institutions." What humans have created, the problems that they have created, they can act to solve.

There is, I think, a real role for leadership, as some members of the committee have already indicated, on the part of the United States in directing the attention and actions of the international community to dealing with the very real and pressing needs of the hungry millions of this planet.

Our own experience in dealing with issues of hunger, mainly in a highly operational role, lead us to draw three principles, three lessons, which, while not exhaustive, we think are central to the issue.

First, and perhaps, obviously, poverty is the cause of hunger. Those who suffer from chronic hunger are those who lack the means to produce or purchase food. Any long-lasting solution to the problem of hunger is going to have to aim at the problem of poverty.

Second, lasting impacts on hunger and poverty require the empowerment of poor people and their communities and organizations to take initiative to solve their own problems. I mean by "empowerment" the freedom of poor people to organize themselves to meet their own objectives and that governments and donors take these initiatives seriously.

Third, addressing chronic hunger requires that impoverished people and communities have access to basic needs. Investing in human resources was de-emphasized by some of the major donors in the late 1980s, and we are seeing the effects of this inattention to basic needs and deteriorating health conditions and increased poverty and hunger in much of Latin America and Africa.

Some suggestions for solutions I've indicated in the testimony, and I will not repeat them here, Mr. Chairman. Let me go on to discuss the situation in the Sudan. What I want to do is emphasize something that Ms. Rosenberg said during her testimony.

The critical situation, particularly in southern Sudan, where access has been more difficult and where the proximity of the warring parties have made the provision of relief extremely difficult.

We work in southernmost Sudan delivering relief commodities to people displaced by war, in the S.P.L.A.-held areas of Torit in eastern Equatoria, in Kaya, in western Equatoria, as well as in the government-controlled garrison town of Juba, where we work with the Lutheran World Federation, S.U.D.A.N.A.I.D., and other relief groups.

I will point out that we are particularly concerned by the condition of the people in the garrison towns of Juba, Malakal, Waum, and Yei. Those towns, controlled by the government, contain among them a population of about 400,000 displaced people, who have been there since 1989.

The needs of these people have been met, to the degree they have been met, by airlifts, either through Operation Lifeline Sudan or, in the case of Juba, an airlift organized by Lutheran World Relief, in which we have been participating.

With the expiration of the second phase of Operation Lifeline Sudan in December of last year, it appears to us that there are going to be no sources of supplies into those cities.

Clearly, the government is not going to be able to act, as things now appear, to resupply them. The airlifts have come to an end.

The roads are not safe. So we are facing a very large tragedy in those cities where those people are residing.

Those people are in a sense hostages of their own condition. They have been seen as the insurance to ensure that the S.P.L.A. will not attack the cities and also insurance that supplies will get into them, that they will be allowed some degree of access.

But unless the corridors of tranquility, which have been emphasized again and again, can be reopened and that the roads and rivers, as well as the air space, can be used to bring food in, we're facing a very, very desperate situation, I believe.

And apart even from the humanitarian issue, the free flow of food, the cost-effective flow of food by the rivers and roads is essential. It costs $1,000 a ton to move food by air. It could be done for a tenth of that on the roads and on the rivers.

So I think there needs to be action to resupply these people and to open those corridors so that people in southern Sudan, on both sides of the lines, can be supplied in this desperate time.

I think it's been made clear that, obviously, the civil war is the root of this famine, but the depredations of war have been exacerbated by the reluctance of both sides to cooperate with relief efforts.

The Government of Sudan's refusal until recently to recognize the severity of the crisis was particularly detrimental to organizing an early international response.

Until there is a cessation of hostilities and movement toward a political solution to the conflict, hunger will continue to imperil Sudan's poorest people.

Continued and increased cooperation by the Government of Sudan is essential. Because of delays and the extremely difficult logistical problems posed in Sudan, many people will probably die, even if the international response proceeds unimpeded. However, additional resources need to be committed by the donor governments to maximize that effect.

I would emphasize that in our view and, I think, in the view of most observers, both sides of the conflict must accept and act according to the principle that food should be provided unimpeded to all those in need, wherever they may be.

We have heard reports that food stocks in the garrison towns, as I mentioned, are extremely low. The future of the Juba airlift is uncertain, and the U.N. flights to S.P.L.A.-held areas have been suspended.

The only way to ensure that food travels in a cost-effective manner and that there is a pipeline sufficient to the need is to allow those corridors to be formed and to stay in existence.

C.R.S. and the U.S. Government, the cooperation with which I think has been outstanding, particularly with Mr. Natsios' office, and other agencies have supported airlifts as the only way to save the displaced in some areas.

We urge both parties to the conflict to respect the corridors of tranquility so that an adequate supply and a sure pipeline can be established to reach those in the garrison town as well as in other areas.

Furthermore, we believe that hundreds of thousands of people who are in the garrison town, those 400,000 displaced that I men-

tioned, should be allowed, if possible, to return to their home areas, some of which are largely peaceful.

They will continue to need assistance, but not at the same levels as required now, and they will have an opportunity to plant crops and regain a measure of self-sufficiency.

We hope that the United Nations will negotiate effectively with the Government of Sudan. The U.N. and the government have reached agreement on many of the obstacles posed in the north, although the news that Art Simon raised about the relocation of people adds a new element to that.

But the Government of Sudan has recently imposed a set of restrictions on N.G.O.'s, the N.G.O.'s cooperating in the south. It has also consistently delayed or rejected the flight plans for Operation Lifeline Sudan II.

The World Food Program is responsible for the areas around Bor, Pibor, and Tindalo, all in the south. Yet, it has failed to secure adequate food donations.

Unless agreement among the warring parties and the U.N. is reached, many people in both the S.P.L.A. and the government-held areas in the south will perish.

What is essential, I think, is that Operation Lifeline Sudan, the umbrella, the regime that allowed, however imperfectly, food to flow in 1989 and 1990, to some degree, be reestablished.

And I think, in that regard, Mr. Chairman, a mechanism, such as Operation Lifeline Sudan; that is, the United Nations providing a regime to work on two sides of a conflict, may form an important precedent. And I think we should look at it for lessons of that kind, for interventions in Iraq today, and also in places like Angola.

Thank you.

Mr. DORGAN. Mr. Swenson, thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. John Swenson appears at the conclusion of the hearing, see p. 105.]

Mr. DORGAN. You will notice a chart on our left and your right with respect to aid to Africa. There is some problem with the food aid; it actually should be a little higher than that. There are some problems with the data that is embodied in that line, that shows that there has been a change in this country's priorities in aid to Africa away from military aid, away from economic support funds, and more toward development assistance.

And you will notice in the chart that's ahead of that, if you take a look at aid generally around the world, you will see that there's not much difference from where we started a decade ago.

There was a difference occurring in the 1980s of a substantial spike in military aid, a real spike in economic support funds. Those spikes are now out of the trend, but we're still back to where we pretty much were at the start of the '80s.

And that still, in the judgment of many of us, emphasizes too much military and economic support aid at the expense of food aid and development assistance.

But with respect to the first chart I mentioned, do you see the results of that in your operations in Africa and are those good results, in your judgment?

Mr. SWENSON. To some degree we have, depending on which place we are in Africa. I agree that the food aid, I think, is skewed

because it doesn't even reflect—that wouldn't even affect the Ethiopian program alone, I don't think.

But yes, I do think that there is slowly coming about a change in this. I don't think we are yet seeing the results of the increased developmental assistance, particularly in the governmental programs, but in some areas we are seeing an increased interest in local governments working with local organizations of people allowing those kinds of organizations, which I think, as I said, is one of the essential conditions for progress.

I would say we haven't seen a big impact yet, but we certainly welcome the trend.

Mr. DORGAN. Mr. Penny?

Mr. PENNY. You took my question.

I'm curious to hear from each of you your attitude about the safe havens in northern Iraq that have been set up by the military and how private organizations in general feel about participating when a nation like the U.S. takes the lead in providing that kind of protection for displaced individuals, especially within a country, where there is a civil dispute.

Mr. SIMON. I think that is more a question for John than for me because Bread of the World is a policy group and isn't operational.

Mr. PENNY. I understand that, but I didn't want to shut you off if you had an opinion.

Mr. SWENSON. Go ahead.

Mr. SIMON. Well, I think that moving in the way we did made sense. I'm pleased that we did. I think we should have done it a bit sooner, but let's be happy that we're doing what we're doing.

It obviously does raise some agonizing questions because you don't yet have U.N. or international authorization for this. And I can understand why the private voluntary organizations might be very, very uneasy, to the point of feeling they cannot move in and do anything until there is adequate international safeguard for the ongoing operation that would be needed.

Mr. PENNY. Having done this, isn't it critically important for the U.S. to then also take the lead at the U.N. and boost up our pledge?

Mr. SIMON. Absolutely. That should be the front-and-center effort right now, I think.

Mr. SWENSON. Yes. C.R.S., as an agency, is not in the business of endorsing policies or politics, but in the sheer need that was there, I don't know that any other response would have been possible and certainly applaud the ability to save lives and provide people more decent conditions in their distress.

Mr. PENNY. But it doesn't do them a great amount of good if the relief organizations that have the resources are uncomfortable in getting these settlements.

Mr. SWENSON. Yes. The degree of discomfort is, I think, one that relates to the future, rather than the represent. That is to say I think all of us, we certainly, see a need for a presence, an operational presence, if we were able to establish it for at least six months and probably much longer.

In this period, it would appear the forces of the United States are going to withdraw from these camps. What is the regime that is going to follow? Are we going to have a condition where the camps

become operational, the United States withdraws, and then we fall into chaos again or the agencies are expelled? What kind of regime is going to exist to permit the needed work to go on? I think that's the major concern.

Mr. PENNY. If assurances were made, let's say we went to the U.N., got their approval to maintain these sites, some assurance that if U.S. troops were pulled out, other U.N.-sanctioned forces would be put in place and that that would remain our policy as an international community until and unless there were a stable relationship within Iraq, that should eliminate any reticence the N.G.O. is going to have.

Mr. SWENSON. I would think so. My own feeling—I just read yesterday the memorandum of understanding between the U.N. and the Government of Iraq. And that in one of its paragraphs provides explicitly for a role by international agencies and N.G.O.'s. I mean, that's foreseen.

But our concern for the future I don't think is necessarily going to prevent us from doing what we can right now. We are going to have a medical team. We are prepared to put a medical team into one of these camps. We have sent supplies to people up on the border.

But we're concerned for the camps, for the type of regime that the U.N. puts up, and which allows us to operate in some sense of security, not only for ourselves, but for the people in the camps, not also for the Kurds, but also for the displaced in southern Iraq as well because this is going to be a large operation.

So getting in and getting involved with long-term committed work, such as the administration of camps, the distribution of food, which involve long logistical pipelines, a great deal of planning and effort, we would—and I don't know that the United States government would disagree with this—like to see an appropriate international regime in which the terms and conditions are clearly understood and where the rights of the refugees and the status of the agencies working there are established.

Mr. PENNY. If we were to establish the U.N. cover for this kind of secure zone, would that be an appropriate pattern for the future? I mean, this is going to be replicated time and time again in other nations, where there is civil unrest, where those people are displaced with a nation, and not that we want to do this every time that occurs because in a lot of instances, we can take care of those needs short of establishing some kind of a military resolve, where we protect the refugees.

I mean, I just don't want us to do this only because it's in the Middle East where, because of the war, we couldn't ignore the problem that then resulted within Iraq.

I have a notion that we could and should use this as a response in similar circumstances and it ought to be part of the new world order. I mean, it really ought to be a way for us to highlight the basic human rights of populations, whether they are in a refugee status within the borders of a nation or whether they cross those borders.

Mr. SWENSON. I think that there are some valuable precedents, which may have an application for the future. I don't think the introduction of troops is necessarily one of those.

But I do think that the role of the United Nations, which is, you know, going into rather unchartered waters—the issue of sovereignty in the past would have, I think, prevented the United Nations from playing the role it is now.

But I think that if a role can be asserted out of the precedent here, meaning if the United Nations' role develops as we hold, and also from previous cases, like Operation Lifeline Sudan and like the Special Relief Program for Angola, if there can be developed a role for the United Nations as legitimizer, protector of humanitarian agencies working on both sides of conflicts and that clear guidelines for which acceptance from individual governments can be won, I think that would be more than welcome.

And I would agree that I think it would be a breakthrough, and I think it would provide a framework within which a lot of needless suffering could be prevented.

Mr. PENNY. Yes. I guess my only point is that I don't advocate that this be our first response in similar cases because oftentimes other less aggressive reactions work, but you do frequently face a circumstance where there is such hostility from the host government or there is such a dangerous military situation within the nation that we are greatly inhibited from doing anything unless we are willing to put into place some kind of a force to protect those who are just the innocent victims of that internal situation.

The other thing is that I believe one of the reasons that Saddam is taking the Kurdish situation seriously is because we're still there. And, as you have indicated, there is some value in relief efforts and getting both sides to agree on humanitarian principles, but you can't always get them to agree on that.

And when you do, it doesn't necessarily mean that they're also going to agree on other negotiations. Sometimes another presence that they have to contend with can be a factor in getting them to face those differences and resolve those differences.

And, again, I think our troop presence in Iraq and our willingness to send troops to northern Iraq to protect the Kurds has facilitated the kind of dialogue that has taken place. And that may also have a precedent for the future.

I don't have any further questions, but I guess I'm chairing the meeting. So I'll call on Mr. Bereuter.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to express my regret to you and the members of the committee and the witnesses we have had on two panels for being involved in floor activity and not being here for the full hearing.

I do have a couple brief procedural matters to take care of first and then turn attention to our witnesses here. In case there is someone here from the State Department and A.I.D., I want to remind them once more, just as I did, once again, yesterday, that the first week in April, I continued to see firsthand children in Angola in the U.N.I.T.A. areas that were dying from the lack of oral dehydration. Clearly preventable diseases are killing these children.

And despite things that were set up, we have this stop and flow. I'm not sure that it's corrected at this point. So I urge you to look at that very carefully and make corrections through the N.G.O.'s or directly.

Second, on Page 12 of Mr. Bissell's testimony, there was very little mentioned by him of the development programs that he discussed in that paragraph, A.I.D.'s development programs.

I would like to ask the staff on a bipartisan basis to pursue some questions in writing to him about examples.

Mr. PENNY. That would be fine.

Mr. BEREUTER. And I would ask unanimous consent for that.

I know firsthand from the university in my own district, of which I am an alum, that they are leading a consortium that is providing some developmental assistance in working in Sudan, sorghum-related activities, which are not only important to Sudan, but which are bringing direct benefits to American agriculture as well.

And I know that's one of about 10 such centers around the world that we ought to know more about, I think. It strengthens our case for working in the area of hunger, and we ought to exploit this source of information and positive attention.

I would ask unanimous consent that it be placed in the record.

Mr. PENNY. Without objection.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you.

And I have two points that I just want to highlight. The first is in welcoming John Swenson and to recognize his distinguished record with an invaluable record, also to say, especially to my colleagues and for the record, that it's a particular delight to have Art Simon with us. He is the President of the Bread for the World and has played a big role for 20 years in making hunger an issue of continuing political concern to the whole country, and especially here in Congress.

And I think it's important that we note that he received well-deserved recognition for his many contributions when he received a lifetime achievement in hunger award from President Bush last October.

We in the Select Committee are sorry that you're going to be retiring from the Bread for the World later this year, but I know that we'll see him and have his participation and wisdom many times, and we look forward to working with his successor, who comes from my home area as well.

Second, to pursue something you started, Mr. Chairman, I understand,—and I heard part of your second round of discussion on this issue—I have some thoughts on paper that seem to perhaps be going the same direction as you do, as your thoughts were going. It relates to the U.N. peacekeeping operations around the world.

I believe we may have come to the point in history where the United Nations, on behalf of the world community, should be encouraged to play an even more active role than it has in previous special initiatives, such as Operation Lifeline Sudan and the Special Relief Program for Angola, in providing safe passage for relief of manmade famines.

When civilians' lives are in danger from internal conflicts that deprive them of food and the political authorities do not allow effective relief, the Security Council could begin to offer the U.N. flag an effective U.N. multilateral military protection for basic humanitarian food and medical relief efforts in certain situations. And I emphasize the last part, "certain situations."

Such a multilateral effort under the U.N. to help the Kurds, for example, would be an appropriate follow-up, I think, to multilateral efforts to free Kuwait from Iraqi occupation.

The millions who are starving in Sudan, due to their own government's refusal to acknowledge their plight and to allow assistance, is another need that cries out for such an assistance from the whole world community of nations, and the United Nations is the logical focus point and acting agent for that effort.

So I think we ought to explore that for several reasons. There are many avenues for us to explore that and pursue that legislatively. And I look for an opportunity to work with my colleagues in that respect.

Now, to our witnesses, I would just ask a very general question to get you started, perhaps helping us understand how we might set additional priorities, redefine priorities for our U.S. foreign assistance priorities in ending hunger or eliminating world hunger.

Mr. Swenson, you suggested in your paper that you have your doubts whether we're pursuing a comprehensive anti-hunger strategy, and I don't think there would be too many knowledgeable people who would disagree with you on that.

I'm wondering if both of you could give me a framework of how we would address what the top priorities are, what the missing elements are for the U.S. government, at least, to design and implement a strategy for eliminating hunger.

I know we can't do it in isolation. What is our component that we could offer as a comprehensive strategy? What are your priorities, in short, for putting our house into order to do a better job?

Is that too general to get you started?

Mr. SWENSON. It's also general enough to allow me to be general. I would say, in general, that I think a few elements that occur to me would be: one, a clear commitment on the part of the Government of the United States to the ending of poverty as a policy.

And from that I think would flow a couple of things: one, the United States in its relations with other countries, particularly of the industrialized world and with international financial institutions, making its leadership and powers of persuasion available to pursuing that objective and putting it high on the agenda of the other nations of the world, particularly those who will be contributing as donors, to the assistance of the countries of the Third World.

The second I think that would flow from that, I hope would flow from that, would be a coordination of the efforts within the United States government; that is to say that our assistance would not be confined to the appropriations and personnel of the Agency for International Development.

It would be reflected in the diplomacy we conduct through the State Department, through our policies on trade, debt, and other related issues that directly impact on the viability of economies in the Third World.

And then I think another important one, and one that has special meaning to us, given our history, is making a clear emphasis in dealing with other countries that resources, such as food, when they are required or needed, but giving increased emphasis to self-sufficiency and the availability of poor people to organize to meet

their own needs, to express their grievances, to operate within societies for their own benefit.

That, in brief, is what I would recommend, sir.

Mr. BEREUTER. Would you like to respond also?

Mr. SIMON. I'll try to, and I won't disagree with John at all. I think what he said makes a lot of sense. I would start where he started and say that the most important thing is the commitment.

If that becomes truly a national commitment in the same way that when John F. Kennedy said, "Let's get a man to the moon by the end of the decade of the '60s and return him to earth safely," you know—we did it because we put some resources. We figured out what it would take to get from here to there and step by step we moved toward the achievement of that goal.

In the case of Kissinger's goals of saying we're in a decade where no child goes to be hungry, we didn't do that. The rhetoric was great, but we just did not move step by step toward implementation.

If the commitment is really there, then we've got to follow through that step-by-step plan or series of plans. And, you know, it can be done. The ways can be found. They may not be perfect ways. We'll certainly make mistakes. But we can make very significant progress, and we can make some of that progress fairly rapidly.

The second thing I'd say in tieing in with your previous remarks, Congressman Bereuter, it seems to me that taking advantage of the end of the Cold War and trying to rally the nations toward efforts to reduce spending on arms and, along with it, I think, necessarily strengthening the role of the U.N. as a peacemaking and peacekeeping agency, if we can do that, you know, then we can shift resources on a very substantial scale. And I think we'll find a much greater level of security in the process than we do by pouring arms into a region like the Middle East.

My third point would be to agree with John on two of his points, the importance of issues like trade and debt. We've got to move on those and realize it's not just a matter of making concessions to developing countries for their sake, but that in the long haul, that's going to return to our benefit, too, because when they develop, when they have an opportunity to raise their standards a little, they become better consumers for the things that we want to sell abroad. So everybody benefits in that respect.

Then the other point that I like very much, which I probably should have put higher on the list here, is that ultimately it is the people themselves who make development happen.

And so we've got to do everything possible to strengthen the role of people at the grass-roots level, at the village and local level, so that they have the resources that they need to be able to do for themselves.

And I don't mind seeing a trend, even though it may not be accurate entirely, a trend of seeing food assistance decline and development assistance go up if that means that people are able to do for themselves. Let's do everything we can to encourage that and enable that to happen.

One final observation here, and that is that I do believe, as I have suggested in my written testimony, that free enterprise is going to play a very big role in any long-term solutions against

hunger. And, again, you know, the collapse of communism has made that inescapably clear.

I would like to qualify that statement, though importantly, by saying there are different kinds of free enterprise. And what I'm talking about is free enterprise that includes everybody and not just free enterprise for the few who may make very big bucks.

Ultimately it has to be free enterprise that your colleague Mr. Emerson suggested, for example, enables a farmer in Bangladesh or maybe an urban boy in Bangladesh to have another $50 to start a business.

Well, it isn't always that simple, but there are ways of providing resources to people on a very small scale, at the grass-roots level, to enable them to become productive members of the society.

And that's the direction, it seems to me, we should move.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thanks to both of you for your responses. I appreciate them very much.

Art, you, in your comments, made mention of the small loan program. At least that's in your written comments. I wasn't here for it. We sometimes have difficulty getting people to think small enough within their own development agencies, that you could really talk about $20 having an impact for one person or for one family, that they'll turn around in three payments.

It's just incredible where it's been tried, places like Peru and Ecuador, on not a governmental program, but an N.G.O. program.

We were discussing this just the other day in the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee, perhaps giving a little more direction to aid. They didn't appreciate it on that score, but that was our intent, to push them to really think small, microenterprise, dollar amounts, but large in resources that we're devoting to it.

The issue I wanted to pursue very briefly is something that you mentioned in your statement, Art, and that I also mentioned in my statement which I put in the record, and that is the Horn of Africa initiative, where you were crucial in helping us draft legislation, which now, incidentally, has over 100 cosponsors——

Mr. SIMON. I'm pleased to hear that.

Mr. BEREUTER. More than 82.

Mr. SIMON. All right.

Mr. BEREUTER. It's going up.

Mr. SIMON. Going up fast.

Mr. BEREUTER. Is there anything we can learn while we're focusing on a particular geographic area for that initiative? Is there anything we can learn in the way of drafting some larger set of priorities or programs for the hungry world?

Are we doing anything that is worthy of emulation on a larger scale if, in fact, we can implement what we put on paper as a proposal?

Mr. SIMON. In that legislation. Well, I do believe, and we think at Bread for the World, that the principles that are embodied in that legislation have a much wider applicability. We focused on a region, rather than just one country, because we think there are some commonalities in that region and that the legislation applies across the board to the whole area.

It seems to me that if we can show that it works there, that it's not going to work overnight—it's not that we're going to take

action this year and the problem is going to be basically solved. We'll have to keep at this for some years.

But if we can show that yes, you can make headway by taking the kinds of steps that are indicated in that legislation, it seems to me that it should have broad application, should make sense elsewhere in Africa or anywhere you've got situations of conflict, or even without situations of conflict, the importance of getting assistance to both U.S.-based and indigenous N.G.O.'s, who can help it to happen at the grass roots, where it has got to happen ultimately if it's going to work.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. PENNY. Thank you, Doug.

With that, we want to thank the witnesses for their participation this morning. The meeting stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, the foregoing matter was concluded at 12:25 p.m.]

[Material submitted for inclusion in the record follows:]

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DOUG BEREUTER
AT THE HEARING ON GLOBAL HUNGER OF THE
INTERNATIONAL TASK FORCE, HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON HUNGER,
APRIL 25, 1991

We are here to look at the famine and hunger picture in the world in 1991. The picture is not pretty, despite the availability of more food and more humanitarian concern and more international cooperation than ever before. It is especially ugly and deadly for those millions like the Kurds, the Sudanese, the Ethiopians, the Somalis, and the Angolans who live in the midst of civil strife with their own governments and other political factions blocking the efforts of international humanitarian relief agencies to reach them.

In 1991 famine deaths are no longer caused by weather but by war. The remedies for famine need to start with peace and respect for human rights by every nation in the international community.

Following on the successful efforts of the multilateral force in the Gulf organized under the auspices of the United Nations and on various UN peacekeeping operations around the world, I believe we may have come to the point in history when the United Nations, on behalf of the world community, should be encouraged to play an even more active role than it has in previous special initiatives (such as Operation Lifeline Sudan and the Special Relief Program for Angola) in providing safe passage for relief of manmade famines. Where civilians' lives

are endangered by internal conflict that deprive them of food and the political authorities do not allow effective relief, the Security Council could begin to offer the U.N. flag and effective U.N. multilateral military protection for basic humanitarian food and medical relief efforts in certain situations. Such a multilateral effort to help the Kurds, for example, would be an appropriate followup to multilateral efforts to free Kuwait from Iraqi occupation. The millions who are starving in the Sudan due to their own government's refusal to acknowledge their plight and allow assistance are another need that cries out for such assistance from the whole community of nations.

The other ugly face of world hunger in 1991 is the continuing deep deprivation and absolute poverty of about one billion people, one-fifth of the human race. This is not an insoluble problem -- many organizations and resources are dedicated to finding an enduring solution to hunger. Yet we must stay focused, especially in the U.S. Government which plays such a vital role on the world scene through our various food aid and development assistance programs, on how to improve the food security of vulnerable people.

I have been pleased to work with Chairman Dorgan and Congressman Wheat on the Horn of Africa Recovery and Food Security Act (H.R. 1454), which now has over 100 cosponsors in the House of Representatives, beginning with the members of this International Task Force and of the Select Committee on Hunger.

but I particularly look forward to working with his talented successor, David Beckmann, a native of the great city of Lincoln, Nebraska.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to make these remarks and for arranging this hearing. I look forward to the testimony.

DURING THE COLD WAR, AFTER THE COLD WAR

PRIORITIES IN U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

(all figures = billions of constant 1992 dollars)

	FY 1981	FY 1985	FY 1991	FY 1992**
Military Aid	4.933	7.648	4.984	4.731
Economic Support Fund	3.235	7.815	4.159	3.240
Development Assistance*	1.961	2.319	2.183	2.673
Food Aid	1.889	2.523	1.018	1.301
TOTAL	12.018	20.305	12.344	11.385

AID TO AFRICA

PRIORITIES IN U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

(all figures = millions of constant 1992 dollars)

	FY 1981	FY 1985	FY 1992**
Military Aid	131	216	37
Economic Support Fund	250	537	28
Development Assistance	461	452	800
Food Aid	495	302	147
TOTAL	1337	1507	1012

* = Includes Special Assistance Initiatives for the Philippines and Eastern Europe
** = Administration Request

Source: Congressional Research Service, AID Congressional Presentation, FY 1987, FY 1992.

Prepared by: Select Committee on Hunger

SOLDIERS OR TEACHERS

	Armed forces as % of teachers
Some of the worst examples:	
Ethiopia	494
Iraq	428
Oman	275
Chad	233
Yemen, PDR	200
Pakistan	154
Some of the best examples:	
Costa Rica	0
Mauritius	10
Ivory Coast	13
Ghana	14
Jamaica	20
Brazil	24
ALL DEVELOPING COUNTRIES	68
LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES	121

Source: Human Development Report 1990, United Nations Development Program (UNDP)

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STATEMENT OF RICHARD E. BISSELL
ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

BEFORE THE
INTERNATIONAL TASK FORCE OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON HUNGER
APRIL 25, 1991

Thank you Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to have the opportunity to testify before the International Task Force of the Select Committee on Hunger. Each day we see reflections of hunger in the world, whether in pictures of Kurdish children in refugee camps with no food or of malnourished and hungry children and adults in Africa, Asia or the Americas.

Each day, 40,000 children under 5 years of age will die from malnutrition and disease. As we enter the 1990s, it is estimated that a total of 700 million people face hunger and malnutrition. Hunger is a complex phenomenon and to define where it is worst is not easy. The pain of starving children and the anguish of parents are the same, whether in a Kurdish refugee camp, in rural Sudan or in urban Peru.

The Problem

Hunger problems in south Asia where nearly half of the world's chronically hungry children live, have been highly

visible. In recent years increasing attention has been focused on hunger in sub-Saharan Africa. Indeed, much of Africa has come to be characterized by chronic food shortages and declining per capita food production. In the 1980s with the deterioration of real income for both rural and urban areas, malnutrition was reported to have increased in Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Togo, Madagascar, Lesotho, Nigeria, Rwanda and Kenya. Although much of Latin America has witnessed dramatic improvements in human welfare, hunger continues to be a severe problem in northeast Brazil, the Andean region and parts of Central America. Finally, many eastern Europeans are facing food shortages as they meet the challenges of transition to democracy.

For most of the world, hunger is associated with food insecurity, characterized by the inability of an individual, a household or a nation to obtain nutritionally adequate food. The Food Security Index, used by Congress in developing the PL 480 legislation, has categorized 37 developing countries, containing 28% of the world's population, as most food insecure. During the same period (1985-1987), 27 developed and developing countries, containing about 13% of the world's population, were categorized as relatively food secure.

Hunger most often occurs among the extremely poor with low incomes, few assets, limited access to social services and limited political power. There are, however, important differences between chronic food insecurity and transitory or emergency food insecurity. Chronic food insecurity

characterizes the daily situation of the 700 million people who are estimated to lack enough food to meet basic consumption needs and sustain labor and good health. Transitory food insecurity lies behind the headlines about the droughts and wars that periodically cause severe food shortages for specific population groups. In northeast and southern Africa an estimated 20 million people are affected by famine. In Ethiopia and Sudan famine and starvation are the result of both drought and internal war. In Angola and Mozambique prolonged insurgencies have led to famine conditions. Fluctuations in the food availability exact the most devastating toll from those who already are living in impoverished conditions and are unable to withstand these shocks.

The Constraints

Some of the most serious impediments to ending hunger around the world include: national policies that limit the ability of the poor to meet their food needs, serious environmental degradation, local constraints at the family and household level and international factors. At the international level, fluctuations in commodity prices, military conflicts and natural disasters can affect the ability of nations to meet the food needs of their people.

At the national level, well-intentioned government policies sometimes limit the purchasing power of the poor (e.g., misuse of the pricing mechanism). Policies to control inflation or reduce foreign debt, in the short term, can result

in high food prices for consumers. And, lack of national infrastructure can hinder transport of food to those in need. The poor, who often live on marginal land, may be ignored by policies that favor resource rich zones. Many nations do not have the capacity to anticipate the climatic fluctuations and pest infestations that can result in sudden famine. Finally, military conflicts within and between nations can result in hunger and starvation, as witnessed in recent weeks in northern and southern Iraq.

Population growth results in increased pressure on scarce resources and a rapidly growing number of children to be fed and nourished. A.I.D.'s population program has increased access to family planning services for millions of couples in the developing world, but the unmet need for contraception remains great. A.I.D. is moving quickly to address environmental concerns, but degradation of the resource base is emerging as one of the most serious constraints to food production and to the poor's access to resources.

Family level conditions, including illiteracy, poor sanitation and health care, can pose serious constraints to ending endemic food deprivation and famine. Lack of technical know-how and financial resources can limit the ability of family members to produce food or purchase it on the market and leave the family without a safety net. Illiteracy and lack of access to basic health services and adequate sanitation contribute to the vulnerability of children. A.I.D. has mounted a Family and Development Initiative which will focus on

needs at the family level as an important building block for development.

The Solutions

Economic growth is absolutely fundamental to any sustained effort aimed at alleviating hunger and poverty. We know that virtually every country that has made significant progress in increasing food availability and adequately meeting their peoples' needs for housing, education, health services, and jobs, has done so within the context of sustained economic growth. We know that economic stagnation, evident in many countries in sub-Saharan Africa and south Asia, is often accompanied by alarming rates of hunger and poverty.

We also know, however, that large segments of the population can continue to live in abject poverty in the midst of economic growth. Clearly, economic growth is essential to a hunger and poverty alleviation strategy, but it is not sufficient. The challenge lies in formulating policies and programs that also address disparities in the population's ability to access the benefits of economic growth, on the one hand, and to contribute to that growth on the other hand. These policies and programs must be designed with great care based on sound analysis of the effects of the policies. Empirical evidence shows, for example, that subsidized credit has succeeded mostly in limiting access to capital by those people for whom such credit was intended in the first place. Using pricing mechanisms to stimulate the growth of the

donors have played important roles in building host-country capacity for policy development and analysis. A.I.D. has also used project and non-project assistance, and the tools of policy dialogue, to encourage important policy change -- and to help moderate the short-term "shocks" that are experienced by vulnerable groups in the course of sorely-needed, albeit painful, economic restructuring.

National and macro-level policy interventions generally fall outside the purview of locally-based NGOs, and even international private voluntary organizations. The roles of both are nevertheless critical in fighting hunger. The volume of private assistance is substantial. Private American assistance for overseas development is estimated to be more than double the amount of official U.S. government assistance. PVOs worldwide are playing increasingly important roles in alleviating poverty and hunger.

The comparative advantage of private voluntary organizations tends to lie at the local rather than the national level. The majority of A.I.D.'s Title II food aid programs are sponsored by PVOs, the World Food Program (WFP), and international relief organizations. In many countries these groups are key players in getting food aid to those who need it most (including the chronically disadvantaged, such as young mothers and their children), and in intensifying local agricultural production, rural development, and related social services (e.g. child survival, health, and population programs). For example, in Togo the Catholic Relief Service

uses Title II resources to provide maternal and child health care, school feeding, and humanitarian aid. In Mali, World Vision Relief and Development has made the difficult transition from a purely relief feeding program to a more carefully targeted program that supports sustainable economic development. And in Haiti, CARE and the Pan American Development Foundation (PADF) are working with approximately 80 local nongovernmental organizations on a major tree planting project that is boosting incomes of the rural poor while enhancing the resource base. These programs help address both immediate and long-term hunger problems since increased rural incomes mean more food purchases, which in turn, stimulate agricultural production. At the same time, protection of the resource base helps to ensure agricultural sustainability.

Local NGOs and international PVOs often know both rural and urban areas well and have the experience and expertise to help get the job done. But their work is most effective when combined with the technical expertise and financial resources of A.I.D. and other donors. At the same time, PVO experience and access to local knowledge help inform governments on the often complex issues of hunger. International PVOs need the help and support of national governments which in turn, often need the help of international donors, both for food aid and for the kind of technical knowledge that has helped make our own U.S. agricultural sector so dynamic. We can and should do more to encourage this mutually beneficial collaboration.

A country's policy environment is the common thread which

runs through situations where there is hunger and also through A.I.D.'s approach to the problems of hunger. For example, fixing transportation prices for relief supplies below real delivery costs can exclude the participation of the private sector and thereby cripple a nation's capacity to provide emergency relief to its citizens. Artificially low food prices, especially in the absence of productivity-increasing technologies, can discourage agricultural production resulting in the long run in scarcer food for everyone.

The A.I.D. Strategy

A.I.D.'s approach to hunger is comprehensive. Substantial resources are provided for short-term emergency disaster relief, resulting from both natural and political causes. The strategy to reduce the effects of transitory food insecurity includes: a) assistance for famine preparedness through early warning systems, improved food needs assessments, support to PVOs working at the grassroots level, support for national institutions to manage drought and other emergency situations; and, b) provision of food and sources of income for those at risk, through our PL 480 program and PVO cosponsors.

The A.I.D. supported Famine Early Warning System (FEWS) extends from Mauritania to Ethiopia and new remote sensing technology has helped organize and respond to emergency situations in record time. In Ethiopia in 1987, and again in 1990, this system provided information to set up programs to avoid possible famine situations. Unfortunately, civil strife

in both Sudan and Ethiopia continue to exacerbate drought conditions in these countries and place millions of people at serious risk of hunger.

At the same time, A.I.D. focuses considerable attention on the longer-term and chronic (if less visible) problems of hunger resulting from deficiencies in productive capacity or in access to food, whether from natural or man-made causes. A.I.D.'s approach to reducing the number of people who live in situations of chronic food insecurity includes: a) policy dialogue and programs that foster sustainable economic growth; b) specific strategies that focus on increasing agricultural productivity and increased agricultural production and utilization; c) policy reforms that promote food market liberalization; d) support for microenterprise development, credit and training programs to create more job opportunities; and e) targeted health and nutrition programs that assist vulnerable groups to utilize their resources more efficiently through better health and child care practices.

Hunger has both a supply and a demand side. Thus, augmenting income-generation opportunities both on- and off-farm are key aspects of our long-term strategies for rural development. A.I.D. also has invested heavily in improving the productive capacity of many nations, through road and infrastructure development, agricultural research and technical assistance, and training.

Through the Democracy Initiative, A.I.D. also is helping developing nations work through the transition to democracy and accountable governance. This, too, will contribute to combatting hunger, as local people are brought more fully into their countries' decision-making processes. Through the Family and Development Initiative, A.I.D. is giving increased attention to the family system within which hunger and malnutrition are most keenly felt. Not only will we take into account the critical intra-family dynamics that effect individual members' access to food, but also we will work to strengthen the capacity of families to provide for the needs of their members.

The Case of Sudan

Finally, I want to up-date the Committee on the situation in Sudan, where A.I.D. is supporting both emergency relief efforts and long term research efforts in relation to food needs. This calendar year Sudan is facing a 1.2 million metric ton food deficit. Response to the emergency situation was facilitated by A.I.D.'s Famine Early Warning system which indicated in August that there would be massive crop failures through much of the country. Relief efforts were delayed by the Government of Sudan's reluctance to recognize the severity of the problem. The government's hesitancy does appear to have affected the level of contributions from other donors. At this time, over 750,000 tons of food assistance has been pledged to the Sudan emergency, 331,000 tons from the U.S. The U.S. and

other donors have agreed to channel food shipments through the WFP. WFP will clear food through Port Sudan and arrange primary transportation to the affected regions where PVOs, working in partnership with local governments and councils, will distribute the food to end use recipients. Despite its rocky start, the system seems to be working and we will continue to watch it closely. Tragically, some children are already dying in Sudan and the relief effort may not be able to move enough food through the pipeline to prevent those deaths from continuing.

At the same time, A.I.D. has been working through the Collaborative Research Support Programs (CRSPS) to stem the worldwide losses of sorghum to Striga, parasitic flowering plants which grow only by attaching their roots to the roots of host plants such as sorghum. Sorghum losses to Striga have been projected to be 5-15 percent per year, the equivalent of 845,000 metric tons per year for sub-Saharan Africa alone. In some cases crop losses are 100 percent. Under the CRSP, research in Indiana, Niger and Sudan has led to the development of a rapid, non-destructive bioassay for assessing Striga resistance, and new genes found to have stable Striga resistance are currently being bred into improved sorghum varieties. The validity of the new assay technology has been confirmed in field studies in Sudan, Niger and the U.S.. The results are expected to make it possible for growers to have Striga-free sorghum production.

CHRONIC FOOD INSECURITY

Mr. Dorgan: Please specify A.I.D.'s strategy for reducing "chronic food insecurity." How much of A.I.D.'s total resources are committed to reducing what you call "chronic food insecurity"? How does your strategy relate to the Bellagio Declaration's four goals?

Answer: The Agency has developed a multifaceted strategy, incorporating long-term and short-range, emergency measures to address chronic food insecurity. Total A.I.D. funding and the amount for agricultural activities are given below (in $ millions):

	1990 (actual)	1991 (appropriated)	1992 (requested)
Total A.I.D.*	6,607	6,412	6,556
Agriculture			
Amount	815	960	994
Percent	(12)	(15)	(15)

*DA, DFA, ESF, SAI, CARA (FY 1990 only)

Most of the funding for agricultural activities is for research and technical assistance. Through an array of global, regional and bilateral projects, A.I.D. is assisting developing countries improve their food and agricultural production systems and the nutritional status of their people. Efforts include research to improve food crops, policy analysis to encourage reforms that will raise food production and improve food distribution, and technical assistance to assess and resolve specific nutritional deficiencies, adapt food processing and fortification technologies, strengthen agricultural research systems, and improve rural infrastructure.

In addition to the above amounts A.I.D. devotes to helping countries achieve food security, the Agency also provides the following funding for food and emergency assistance (in $ millions):

	1990 (actual)	1991 (appropriated)	1992 (requested)
P.L. 480*	810	1,065	936
Intl. Disaster Assistance	30	40	40

*Title II & III Grants

Resources available under PL 480 Titles II and III are used to provide food aid to those who need it most (including the chronically disadvantaged) and to intensify local agricultural production, rural development and related social services.

With International Disaster Assistance, the Agency supports extensive famine early warning networks worldwide and has established mechanisms for rapidly responding to identified food shortages, as requested by national or international authorities.

A.I.D.'s strategy is fully supportive of the goals set by the Bellagio Declaration for the 1990s:

--Eliminate deaths from famine.

--End hunger in half of the poorest households.

--Cut malnutrition in half for mothers and small children.

--Eradicate iodine and vitamin A deficiencies.

To assure that the United States makes a substantial contribution to achieving those important goals in collaboration with other donors and international organizations, A.I.D. has established a specific set of objectives for its nutrition programs, as follows:

--reduction of protein-energy malnutrition in children under five years of age (1980 base-line) by at least 25 percent by 1995 and at least 50 percent by the year 2000;

--reduction of micronutrient deficiencies (iron deficiency in women of child-bearing age and children under five years of age and vitamin A deficiency that results in nutritional blindness) by at least 25 percent of 1980 base line levels by 1995 and by at least 50 percent by the year 2000;

--improvement in women's nutritional status and nutritional literacy to improve their productivity, health, and well-being and (for women of child-bearing age) to reduce the number of low birth weight babies and provide reserves for breastfeeding; and

--expanded household-level access to high quality, nutritious foods.

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FUNDING FOR AIDS AND CHILD SURVIVAL IN AFRICA

Mr. Dorgan: Figures supplied to Select Committee on Hunger staff by A.I.D. indicate that funding for child survival activities and AIDS in Africa will decline dramatically in FY 1992. According to the data supplied by your agency, the level of funding in FY 1991 for the category "Total Child Survival" is estimated at $50,096,000, while your requested level for FY 1992 for the same category is listed as $40,690,000. This is a requested cut of nearly twenty percent. According to the data supplied by your agency, the level of funding in FY 1991 for the category "Total AIDS" is estimated at $31,017,000, while your requested level for FY 1992 for the same category is listed as $15,091,000. This is a requested cut of more than fifty percent.

A.I.D.'s Mission Statement includes working "to improve the quality of human life and expand the range of individual opportunities by reducing poverty, ignorance, and malnutrition. In the context of this statement, and the needs of Africa, these cuts appear incomprehensible to me. Please explain to the Task Force the rationale for such drastic cuts in these key AIDS programs.

Answer: Budget data shared with the Select Committee were preliminary figures. Actual FY 1990 figures and estimates for FY 1991 and FY 1992 are as follows (in thousands of dollars) from all funding sources:

	FY1990	FY1991	FY1992
Total AIDS	51,382	79,800	71,800
[AIDS Africa	13,620	29,243	15,681]
Total Child Survival	185,587	203,000	211,700
[Child Survival/Africa	45,378	47,125	39,765]

FY 1991 funding levels represent a substantial expansion over FY 1990 levels and include multi-year funding of bilateral programs for both AIDS and child survival. For example, the major new AIDS program in Uganda will receive $12 million in FY 1991.

Furthermore, the decreases between FY 1991 and FY

1992 levels for child survival and AIDS in Africa may not occur. Historically, our estimates for future programs in these areas tend to be lower than the levels actually realized. Thus, funding estimates for both AIDS and child survival may increase as we approach FY 1992 and missions are able to make firmer projections.

SUPPORTING ENVIRONMENTALLY SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURAL PRACTICES

Mr. Dorgan: As you stated in your testimony, environmental degradation is a serious constraint on food production among the poor. Please detail, supplying examples, how A.I.D. is moving to address this problem by supporting more environmentally sustainable agricultural practices.

Answer: I welcome the opportunity to describe in more detail A.I.D.'s efforts to address this important problem. A.I.D. promotes broad-based, environmentally sound economic growth by helping to strengthen the capacities of developing countries to overcome the policy, technological, and structural constraints on their development. We do this by funding research at U.S., international, and developing country institutions; providing technical advice and training; and supporting the establishment and strengthening of institutions that are needed to promote sustainable development.

The Agency has been in the forefront of efforts to focus the research and technology transfer activities of the international agricultural research centers on sustainable agriculture. (The U.S. finances about 17 percent of the core operating costs of these centers.) Their work in such areas as alley cropping, biological control of insect pests, protection of genetic resources, national food and agricultural policies, and strengthening national research systems has been important in providing technologies and promoting improved farming practices for sustainable agricultural development in many developing countries.

Also, in FY 1991 A.I.D.'s Office of Agriculture has increased funding for six on-going Collaborative Research Support Programs (CRSPs) by 20 percent over recent annual levels in order to increase their focus on sustainable agriculture. At research sites around the world, these CRSPs are helping to resolve problems affecting the productivity of agriculture and destruction of the environment.

--The soils management CRSP is developing sustainable alternatives to slash and burn agriculture. Working in Peru, CRSP researchers have devised methods for, among other things, using trees and cuttings from trees to improve the fertility and productivity of lands already cleared for and degraded by agricultural use.

--The pond dynamics CRSP is increasing the profitability of fish farming as part of integrated farming systems that provide increased employment and a dependable, inexpensive source of animal protein.

--The bean/cowpea CRSP has a research project for the biological control of the major insect pests of beans and cowpeas, thus reducing or eliminating the need for chemical pest control. This CRSP focuses on the development of improved varieties with resistance to diseases and insects and efficiency of biological nitrogen fixation.

--The sorghum and millet CRSP has developed production technology for improved water utilization and erosion control in both sorghum and millet production systems. The CRSP has achieved a breakthrough in the control of Striga in sorghum which should contribute to increased sorghum production in areas of Africa and Asia that became marginal due to heavy Striga infestation. Sorghum and millet cultivars with resistance to diseases and insects have been developed.

--Intercropping systems of millet and cowpeas also have been developed that result in increased production over that of both commodities in monoculture. In the Sahel the need for returning organic matter to the soil for increased production has been demonstrated. Sorghum and millet cultivars resistant to a number of pests and diseases have been developed, lowering or eliminating the need for chemical control.

--The peanut CRSP has developed peanut cultivars and production systems that lower or eliminate the development of Aspergillus flavus that causes aflatoxin. Cultivars of peanuts have been developed with both insect and disease resistances that lower or reduce the requirement of chemical control. Integrated pest management strategies for controlling peanut insects have been developed.

--The small ruminants CRSP developed a new vaccine against contagious caprine pleuropneumonia in Kenya. Once it is widely available, the vaccine will prevent an average of 82 annual outbreaks involving an estimated 300,000 goats in Kenya alone.

The Office of Agriculture is designing a new sustainable agriculture CRSP that will involve the land-grant and other universities along with private voluntary organizations. The National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences will manage the CRSP's global research plan design process, which includes a "peer review" of proposals on systems research focused on the major constraints to sustainable agriculture.

Other centrally managed research and technical services projects are being planned or revised to provide support to A.I.D. mission programs in integrated pest management, natural resources management and improving the capacity of local institutions to make sound decisions about the use of their natural resources. For example, in the Office of Forestry, Energy and Natural Resources a major new project is being launched to support development of host country organizational and institutional capacities; build analytical and managerial skills needed to integrate agricultural, economic and environmental objectives; and promote timely information dissemination.

The Office of Agriculture's soil management support services project assists countries to conduct resource inventories, an important tool for making environmentally sound decisions on land use for sustainable production. A research project on tropical legumes has not only increased the capabilities of some plants to biologically fix nitrogen from the soil, but has been instrumental in assisting countries such as Thailand develop local capability for the production and distribution of the bacteria needed to enhance biological nitrogen fixation. The results of this project will decrease the need for chemical nitrogen fertilizer. The integrated pest management project provides technical assistance, training, research and information networking on pest control to developing countries in the semi-arid and humid tropics.

In Latin America, a regional environmental and natural resources management project seeks to create conditions for public and private institutions to generate, transfer and apply the information essential for sustained use of natural resources in Central America. Sustainable agriculture is a major area of emphasis for this 40 million dollar project.

A new Caribbean regional project, to begin this year, will help improve environmental quality in Eastern Caribbean countries through community participation in management of

coastal and natural resources. New land-use planning and developmental policies will encourage integration of agricultural practices with industry and tourism for sustainable, environmentally sound and economically viable use of the region's natural resources.

The Agency's plan for supporting natural resources management in Sub-Saharan Africa focuses on soil fertility/conservation, loss of vegetative cover, and maintenance of biological diversity. A.I.D. is developing and testing a strategic framework for showing factors that have measurable impacts on agricultural productivity.

In Africa, the emergency locust/grasshopper assistance project focuses on short-term technical assistance and long-term capacity-building. This is one of the first activities to address ecologically rational pest and pesticide management in Africa as an important environmental area for agricultural productivity and food security.

In Egypt, A.I.D. activities have included promotion of biological and mechanical control of crop pests, crop rotation and intercropping, minimum tillage and development of more salt-tolerant cultivars.

In Indonesia the Agency's efforts have included training in

integrated pest management for agricultural workers, introduction of ridge terracing and alley cropping and establishing nurseries to meet farmers' needs for conservation fodder and trees.

For India, A.I.D. has funded the development of biopesticides for control of certain pests; the use of nitrogen-fixing trees and shrubs; and research on improved genetic materials for food, medicines, and other agricultural products.

In Bangladesh, A.I.D.'s farming system research project has developed 16 cropping patterns with associated technologies that emphasize sustainable techniques, including broiler fish production, pulses cultivation, and salinity control.

In addition to support for Nepal's well-known forest and agro-forestry activities, A.I.D. has funded irrigation research and development based on a sustainable model, the goals of which are efficient use of research and recovery of costs from the users.

It is clear from these example that A.I.D. is very seriously pursuing environmentally sustainable agriculture for developing countries, in terms of both research that the Agency supports and technology transfer to developing countries.

A.I.D. PLANS FOR USING CRSPS

Mr. Bereuter: Your testimony cites a good example of improvement in the productivity for a basic food crop (sorghum) through the Collaborative Research Support Programs (CRSPs) that A.I.D., under Title XII legislation authority, established in partnership with the university community. Congress has provided strong funding for CRSP activities because of well documented success in improving agricultural production both in the U.S. and in the developing world. CRSP activities have also focused on nutrition and on the relationship between food production and natural resource preservation.

What are A.I.D.'s future plans for the CRSP program and its funding levels? How can the CRSP program further assist in combatting hunger and malnutrition problems throughout the world?

Answer: The CRSPs are long-term research programs that have generated effective technologies to address developing country and U.S. problems. The funding levels of six CRSPs were increased by 20 percent in FY 1991 to strengthen their sustainable agriculture and natural resource management components. While proposed funding levels were reduced slightly in FY 1992 because of budgetary stringencies, A.I.D. intends to continue funding for the CRSPs to further our efforts to combat hunger and malnutrition through sustainable agriculture development.

A.I.D., in collaboration with the National Research Council and outside consultants, is completing design of a new sustainable agriculture CRSP, which we expect to begin in FY 1992. We are broadening the soils management CRSP to include complementary elements from

other centrally-managed research projects. In addition, we are considering new collaborative projects in pest management and postharvest utilization.

A council comprised of representatives of all the CRSPs is identifying areas where integration of collaborative research efforts can assist in combatting hunger and malnutrition as well as better address sustainable agriculture and natural resource management concerns. The council has identified watersheds in Honduras and in the Sahel (Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso) as possible locations for collaborative inter-CRSP research activities. CRSPs are working together in developing systems-based approaches for watersheds and other micro-environmental units. This includes evaluating the impact of new technologies on the nutritional well-being and health of village children and adults. Useful approaches are also expected from the close scientific relationships that have been established with the International Agriculture Research Centers.

FAMILY AND DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVE

Mr. Hall: What new will be done under A.I.D.'s Family and Development Initiative that is not presently part of A.I.D.'s child survival, maternal health, basic education, AIDS, or other programs?

Answer: Focusing on the role of the family in development is not a new idea. It is used in many areas, from farming systems research to education policies. However, there are many instances where it is overlooked and could provide important insights for the design and implementation of policies and programs. The perspective reflected by this initiative should flow through A.I.D.'s current and new programs to improve their effectiveness and impact on people. In some cases, there may be new activities, in others expansion of on-going programs that have successfully focused on the family and in still others a new lens through which existing activities are viewed. Decisions affecting children are made by their families. Benefits to children occur not only from assistance directed specifically at children, but also as a result of more attention to the dynamics of the family system during the design and implementation of both project and non-project assistance in all areas of A.I.D.'s portfolio. Expanded use of "family level" analysis in project and program planning will enhance the success and effectiveness of a broad range of development efforts and will support the real needs of poor families and

their children. In addition to the analytic component of this initiative, programmatic strategies will include: increasing family income by expanding opportunities for participation by families in the economy; strengthening the family's capacity to care for and support its members through improved options for health care, family planning, education, nutrition and other social services; and reducing the impact of conditions which place family members at risk.

Question for the Record submitted to Ms. Rosenberg
The International Task Force of the
House Select Committee on Hunger
April 25, 1991

Q.1.A major theme of your presentation was that the only lasting solution to food security in Africa lies in the peaceful resolution of its many conflicts.

-- Should the U.S. look beyond your recommendation to more creative approaches to humanitarian emergencies, such as, for example, new ways for interested states to respond to internal humanitarian emergencies, such as in the Sudan right now?

-- Should the U.S. be willing to infringe on the sovereignty of some states under certain specified conditions?

-- If so, is the violation of the right to food by a government a sufficient condition to consider such actions?

A. Resolution of Africa's internal conflicts is not only key, but is primarily a matter for the African parties directly involved. The OAU and Africa's regional organizations have a major role to play. The United States is willing to assist in the resolution of conflicts whenever we and the African parties directly involved believe our participation would be useful.

Comprehensive emergency relief operations to provide food and other necessary assistance to African emergencies are already in place. The United States has led the way in getting them there. In troubled Sudan, we have seen some positive movement recently to facilitate relief to broader areas. We hope both parties to the conflict will continue to move the situation in the right direction to avoid more human suffering.

The United States is committed to using all appropriate channels to provide humanitarian assistance to those in need.

Q. Is the U.S. now planning a high-level effort through the U.N. Security Council to put in place immediately the kinds of comprehensive emergency relief operations to provide food, medicine, and other urgently-needed supplies to respond to African emergencies as those presently under way in Bangladesh and in and around Iraq? If not, why not?

A. The United States continues to work with United Nations specialized agencies and relief organizations, private voluntary organizations, other donor governments, and governments and relevant insurgent groups in affected African countries to guarantee timely delivery of famine relief and other humanitarian assistance to those in need. For current food emergencies across Africa, donors have been able to work together to anticipate problems and identify areas where assistance would be needed. In many instances, this allowed supplies and delivery systems to be put in place before a crisis point was reached and to adapt to changing conditions.

No relief operation can run smoothly without the cooperation of governments and all other groups involved in affected countries. The United Nations Secretariat and specialized agencies have played a role in securing such cooperation. The Security Council remains a forum that can be utilized at the appropriate time if African states determine that it should be approached.

Joint donor responses to recent international emergencies outside Africa were extraordinary, in part, because urgent, life-threatening conditions arose in areas where no relief infrastructure was in place.

Question for the Record submitted to
Deputy Assistant Secretary Rosenberg
Submitted by Representative Byron L. Dorgan
Select Committee on Hunger, House Foreign Affairs Committee
April 25, 1991

Q. There has not been any official U.S. presence in Somalia since we withdrew our Ambassador a few months ago. Security, of course, is still a serious consideration. But the situation is a humanitarian disaster. What specifically are we doing to help?

A. The U.S. has focused on providing emergency relief through the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The U.S. made a recert contribution of $18 million to the ICRC; we expect the ICRC to use about $2 million of that for relief operations in Somalia. In addition, 12,000 metric tons of U.S. food authorized for refugees may be used for World Food Program emergency assistance. ICRC is also distributing U.S. foodstuffs.

April 18 President Bush authorized transfer of $10 million from the Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund for Africa to international relief organizations for Ethiopian and Somali refugees and returnees.

A disaster assistance expert made an assessment visit to Mogadishu in mid-May and is planning additional trips as security permits. Earlier visits by American PVO assessment teams to Mogadishu, Baidoa, Belet Weyne and Brava will result in requests for further U.S. support.

STATEMENT OF CONGRESSMAN BILL EMERSON
Hearing of House Select Committee on Hunger
2222 Rayburn House Office Building
April 25, 1991

"GLOBAL HUNGER in 1991"

Within "a decade no child will go to bed hungry,....no family will fear for its next day's bread, and...no human being's future...will be stunted by malnutrition." This was the declaration of the United Nations World Food Conference -- in 1974. Today, seventeen years later, we bear constant witness to the crippling effects of poverty and hunger around the world.

Worse still, these problems seem to be gaining on us. From the plight of two million terrified Iraqis fighting over rounds of bread; to the untold millions of Sudanese at risk of starvation, hoping food aid will come before the rains do; to the plain, unforgiving fact that each day one billion of the world's people are hungry or vulnerable to hunger -- we are reminded that on every front, on every continent, there are issues that need our urgent attention.

Today we will hear from our witnesses their thoughts on the root causes of hunger and their suggestions for what can be done to eradicate endemic deprivation in the future. I look forward to

hearing their testimony.

We know that the causes of hunger are many: poverty, civil conflict, poor policy planning, crushing national debt, natural disaster, and environmental degradation. Faced with this list of horrors, should we simply wring our hands in despair? Emphatically no. There are solutions. There is hope. There has been progress.

It is clear to all of us, however, that no single solution will work to end all hunger everywhere. There must be a variety of strategies - addressing both economies and individuals - to combat these intractable problems. If it means bringing warring parties to the negotiating table -- so be it. If it means creating new debt repayment schemes -- we should look at that, too. If it means lending $50 to a woman in Bangladesh to start her own small business - fine. We simply need the creativity, the flexibility, and the will to do it.

TESTIMONY

OF

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE

ALISON P. ROSENBERG

BEFORE

THE INTERNATIONAL TASK FORCE

OF

THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON HUNGER

APRIL 25, 1991

Mr. Chairman,

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the International Task Force this morning. We remain very concerned, as you are, about the serious food emergencies and conflicts now plaguing Africa.

SUDAN

I know that you are particularly interested in the current situation in Sudan, and so I will discuss that issue first.

Hunger in Sudan this year is more complicated because it encompasses two problems. Problem one is hunger among the several million southern Sudanese affected by the ongoing civil war, and has been with us since 1988. Problem two is a nationwide food gap this year caused by two years of below-average rains, exhaustion of buffer stocks, and a lack of foreign exchange to purchase food abroad.

This year's nation-wide emergency was foreseen by donors and the UN as early as last August. The Government of Sudan refused at that time to acknowledge the emergency and only in February promised to cooperate with donors and the UN.

We were not waiting. Even before Sudan requested emergency assistance, we were shipping food. We have committed ourselves to providing 331,000 tons of food--one-third of the estimated need of 1.2 million tons. Some of this food already is in Sudan en route to the hungry, and more is on the way. Other donors have promised over 400,000 tons.

Khartoum is now cooperating on northern relief, but it is hindering southern relief. It has denied permission to the ICRC to operate in southern Sudan and suspended UN flights and World Food Program convoys there. We, and the UN, are urging Khartoum to resume these vital programs. Food from the United States and other donors continues to move into some areas of southern Sudan through non-governmental organizations which operate independently, but it is imperative that the UN operations resume quickly if tragedy is to be averted. Neither the government nor the rebel Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) has respected the zones of tranquility set up by Operation Lifeline Sudan, as each side clearly favors its own military objectives over food for the hungry.

While this year's civil war and drought-related hunger problems are immediate concerns, we should remember that Sudan has a permanent food problem. Only the scale is greater this year. Even in a year of normal rainfall, Sudan has a food gap approaching 500,000 tons, which is normally filled by donor contributions and commercial imports. This gap is caused by

high population growth and the ruinous economic policies which the Sudanese governments of the past 20 years followed. Hunger is exacerbated by the ongoing civil war, but would exist even if peace broke out tomorrow.

ETHIOPIA

In Ethiopia, the last eighteen months have seen almost endless negotiation with the Government and insurgents to establish safe passage arrangements for relief deliveries to drought victims and refugees. This has involved the combined efforts of the Administration, the Congress, private voluntary organizations, and relief agencies. It has been frustrating and infuriating -- and for some brave relief workers physically dangerous -- but we can all take satisfaction in the success we have achieved to date.

Safe passage arrangements were reached in early 1990 for delivery of food through the port of Massawa. This agreement was overturned, however, by the Eritrean People's Liberation Front capture of the port of Massawa in February 1990, and by subsequent Government bombing of the port.

As a result, alternate arrangements were hammered out for delivery through the port of Asseb. The donors then turned back to the question of opening Massawa. After nine months of effort, a plan was developed which allowed deliveries to Massawa to start in January 1991.

We are currently working out safe passage arrangements to open supply lines to the Sudanese refugee camps in Western Ethiopia -- lines threatened by the most recent fighting.

ANGOLA

The United Nations estimates that some 1.9 million Angolans require emergency assistance, including as many as 800,000 persons seriously affected by four years of drought and sixteen years of civil conflict. Needs became particularly severe in early 1990, as drought conditions intensified throughout southern Angola and the Luanda regime's military offensive against the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) affected key agricultural areas near Mavinga.

In June 1990, UNITA proposed the creation of "corridors of peace" to permit humanitarian deliveries to reach affected civilians wherever they were located in relation to the conflict. The State Department welcomed this proposal and began discussions with the Government of the People's Republic of Angola (GPRA), UNITA, and the United Nations to seek early implementation of balanced, cross-line and cross-border famine relief deliveries. We also encouraged the parties to permit similar deliveries by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) which has provided assistance to civilians on both sides of the conflict.

During a July 1990 visit to Luanda by Deputy Assistant Secretary Jeffrey Davidow, the GPRA agreed to ask the U.N. to develop a plan to aid Angolans throughout the country by the fastest and most efficient means. In August, the United Nations presented its plan of operations--the Special Relief Programme for Angola (SRPA)--to the GPRA. The plan appealed for $103.5 million in donor assistance, including 118,000 tons of food. The U.S. has pledged some $30 million in funding including 40,000 tons of food plus seeds, tools, medicines and administrative and transport costs. Deliveries are to be made by U.S. private voluntary organizations under UN auspices.

There have been suspensions of the SPRA since that time, but we continued to press the GPRA to honor its commitments to permit cross-line and cross-border deliveries in subsequent high-level correspondence and visits to Angola. We also raised our concerns with suspensions with the United Nations, Angola's neighbors and the international community.

Andrew Natsios, head of AID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, deserves special mention for his untiring efforts. His unwillingness to take "no" for an answer made a big difference.

Deliveries to both GPRA and UNITA areas finally resumed March 28 and additional convoys travelled April 15, 20 and 25 (today). We are continuing to monitor the situation closely and will continue to urge both sides to honor the humanitarian principles of the SPRA and to facilitate relief deliveries on both sides of the conflict.

LIBERIA

U.S.-funded relief began early in the Liberian civil war with assistance to the refugee-impacted areas in Cote d'Ivoire, Sierra Leone and Guinea. Safe passage and zones of tranquility were not issues in these efforts.

Later, U.S.-funded relief went to the territory controlled by Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). Since the NPFL controlled the port of Buchanan, which Catholic Relief Services (CRS) selected for most movements of relief commodities into Taylor's area, there was no need for safe passage arrangements.

Food shipments through Monrovia port began after the military forces (ECOMOG) of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) had stabilized the city. Again, zones of tranquility and safe passage were not required. Since the cease-fire went into effect on December 2, 1990, passage of relief goods has been essentially unimpeded. To date, the

United States has contributed over $127 million to relief for Liberians affected by the conflict.

MOZAMBIQUE

During Mozambique peace talks in Rome which established a partial cease-fire covering the Beira and Limpopo corridors, the U.S. delegation raised the idea of adding the Tete corridor as another cease-fire zone in order to facilitate food deliveries to refugees in Malawi. Unfortunately, the RENAMO delegation rejected this idea.

On numerous occasions since December, the United States Ambassador in Maputo has used his position on the Joint Verification Commission (JVC) which oversees the cease-fire to lobby FRELIMO and RENAMO members on the need for a cease-fire in the Tete corridor. Deputy Assistant Secretary Davidow raised this issue with RENAMO President Afonso Dhlakama on March 11. We have also held numerous discussions with high-level Malawian and Mozambican officials to urge their cooperation in militarily reopening the Tete corridor.

During the upcoming round of peace talks in Rome beginning April 26, we plan to support the idea of safe passage through the Tete corridor on certain pre-determined days under ICRC auspices.

The United States has supported ICRC efforts to open health and food delivery programs in RENAMO-controlled areas. There has been some progress in this regard. RENAMO has allowed ICRC to resume some food deliveries to areas under its control. The ICRC has also initiated health programs in RENAMO areas of Sofala province.

During the upcoming round of peace talks, we will support cross-border feeding schemes (from Malawi) linked to ICRC's idea of creating a 50 kilometer non-combat zone along the Malawi-Mozambique border.

SOMALIA

A peaceful solution to Somalia's internal strife is essential if a lasting solution to food security is to be found.

Siad Barre's departure from the seat of authority in Mogadishu has ushered in a wave of strife among Somali factions. We are not taking sides among the various factions, but we believe Somalia's disintegration--which has given rise to the need for international relief--must be addressed. The United States is considering ways to go about this.

The United States wishes to see a political process leading

to reconciliation of Somali factions. Outside mediators could play a constructive role; these could include the OAU and UN. We believe the international community should push to get the factions together--and we are doing so in our contacts with representatives of the various Somali groups as well as in discussions with other concerned nations.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and other relief organizations report widespread hunger in the southern cities of Mogadishu and Kismayo. Ships have brought in only a small portion of the amounts needed. Relief efforts are complicated by the insecure conditions in Mogadishu and the countryside. An ICRC relief team withdrew from the northern town of Berbera after attacks by armed robbers. Just in the last few days ICRC has had to withdraw from Kismayo as well because of growing insecurity. An ICRC delegation continues to work in Mogadishu.

The United States has focused on providing emergency relief through the ICRC, to which we recently contributed $18 million; prorated, at least $2 million of that will go for relief operations in Somalia. In addition, 12,000 metric tons of U.S. food authorized for refugees may be used for World Food Program emergency assistance. ICRC was also distributing U.S. foodstuffs before its Berbera operation closed. Private voluntary organizations' assessment teams have visited Somalia to prepare proposals for further assistance. We are prepared to do more and are looking for ways to augment humanitarian assistance and ensure delivery where it is needed. Unfortunately, little can be done until the security situation improves and the ICRC and other relief organizations can get programs established.

HUNGER AND CONFLICT IN AFRICA

Hunger in Africa today is in large part the result of internal conflicts which have produced - and continue to produce - untold human suffering. Civil wars in Sudan, Ethiopia, Liberia, Angola, Mozambique and Somalia have displaced millions of innocent civilians, many of whom are now at risk of starvation.

The fundamental causes of these conflicts are rooted in Africa's many and multifacted disputes. Many of Africa's civil wars date from independence or before. For example, arguments over the proper balance between central authority and regional autonomy have split northern and southern Sudanese and Eritreans and other Ethiopian groups for decades. Unfortunately, in country after country the disputing parties have resorted to arms in futile attempts to resolve their differences - differences which could have been, and should have been, resolved in the political arena. For many generations, these regional, political, ethnic and religious differences have driven these conflicts.

Of course, arms can play a role in prolonging conflicts, if not in creating them. Massive shipments of Soviet arms to the government of Ethiopia may have promoted overconfidence in the feasibility of a military solution to that country's civil wars and an ensuing reluctance to explore negotiated solutions. But those arms flows have ceased, and Ethiopia's wars go on. In the case of Liberia, none of the parties to the recent civil war was heavily armed; and in 1987, the latest year for which figures are available, the Government of Liberia's defense expenditures represented less than two and a half percent of GDP. Yet the Liberian conflict generated hundreds of thousands of refugees.

The only real solution to Africa's internal conflicts, and to the hunger and suffering they have caused, are negotiations between the parties involved aimed at achieving a peaceful resolution of their disputes. As events and years of inconclusive bloodshed have demonstrated, the military option is simply not viable.

The United States is willing, indeed anxious, to assist in facilitating negotiated solutions to Africa's civil wars whenever we and the African parties believe our participation would be useful.

We have supported the efforts of the Economic Organization of West African States (ECOWAS) to achieve a ceasefire in Liberia and encourage the Liberian parties to negotiate a peaceful resolution of their political differences. We are providing technical assistance and expertise at the talks between the MPLA Government in Angola and UNITA currently being held under Portuguese auspices in Lisbon. We are doing the same at the talks between the Government of Mozambique and RENAMO now taking place in Rome under the auspices of Sant' Egidio, a Catholic social welfare organization, as well as the Vatican and the Italian Government. We have sought to bring the GPDRE and the EPLF to the negotiating table and will continue to do so. In Sudan, we have pointed out to both the government and the insurgent SPLA that a military solution is not possible and that they should start talking without preconditions.

Not all our efforts or those of other friends of peace in Africa may bear fruit soon. But I believe there is cause for optimism in the fact that several sets of negotiations are going on at once and that in some cases - particularly the Angola talks - notable progress has already been made.

I should note here that most African governments do not devote a large portion of their resources to military spending. For example, according to the latest figures available to me, in 1990 Nigeria spent approximately one

percent of its GNP on defense; Senegal spent two percent of its GDP in 1989; and Kenya spent one percent that year. I should also point out that African governments have the same legitimate defense responsibilities as governments elsewhere - including defense of their own frontiers and contributions to international peacekeeping efforts.

Sierra Leone, now facing unprovoked attack from elements of the Liberian NPFL, would not be able to defend itself at all if it had abjured military spending in the past. ECOWAS peacekeeping efforts in Liberia itself are based on the presence of military contingents from member states. Nor could Senegal, Niger and Sierra Leone have contributed small but symbolically important contingents to Operation Desert Storm if they had not spent the small amounts necessary to maintain viable armed forces.

Obviously, Africa's governments should - and for the most part do - spend far more on national development than on their militaries. Obviously too, the United States should - and does - focus its assistance efforts on development. For FY-92 we are requesting $800 million for the Development Fund for Africa, $ 28 million in Economic Support funds, $147 million in non-emergency food assistance, and only $34 million in military assistance - less than three and one-half percent of our total aid request for Africa.

And much of that $34 million in military assistance, if approved, will be used for purposes directly supportive of national development. Our Regional Military Assistance Program, for example, includes a Civic Action Program to help African militaries play a concrete role in development through construction of bridges and hospitals, and a Coastal Security Program to help African countries protect their fisheries resources.

The Regional Program is also intended to assist African militaries with training in peacekeeping techniques, complementing our efforts to facilitate the resolution of Africa's internal conflicts. We want to encourage and support the peaceful resolution of Africa's internal conflicts, and one of the best ways of doing so is to ensure that capable African peacekeeping forces are available to guarantee the settlements we all hope will emerge from current and future negotiations.

Thank you.

Bread for the World
A Christian Citizens' Movement in the USA

TESTIMONY OF ARTHUR SIMON

PRESIDENT, BREAD FOR THE WORLD

before

THE INTERNATIONAL TASK FORCE OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON HUNGER

April 25, 1991

802 Rhode Island Avenue, N.E. Washington, DC 20018 202-269-0383

First, let me thank you, Congressman Dorgan and members of the Task Force, for the invitation to testify. My name is Arthur Simon. I am president of Bread for the World, an inter-denominational network of some 43,000 volunteers, who seek justice for hungry people through public policy action. I also serve as president of Bread for the World Institute on Hunger and Development, which does research and education--again, with an emphasis on public policy.

Last October on World Food Day, with sponsorship and support from various private voluntary organizations, Bread for the World Institute published Hunger 1990: A Report on the State of World Hunger, the first of an annual series. The report included these points:

+ During the decade of the 1980s the number of hungry people increased both worldwide and in our own country.

+ By conservative estimates, more than 500 million persons worldwide suffer chronic malnutrition, and in the United States from 18-20 million people do not get enough to eat for at least part of each month. If you include others in the Third World who live on less than $1 a day and are vulnerable to hunger, at least periodically, the worldwide number would double.

+ Hunger is fostered by a multitude of causes, with extreme poverty and powerlessness almost always factors.

Based upon 45 country studies and regional surveys, Hunger 1990 drew the following conclusions:

Conclusion #1: Militarization is a primary cause of hunger. Military spending should be reduced in developing and developed nations alike; most of the savings should be redirected to meet human and development needs.

Conclusion #2: National and international development efforts have often overlooked women's needs and skills. Women should be full participants in the design and execution of programs to reduce hunger and its structural causes.

Conclusion #3: Environmental destruction, rapid population growth, and hunger are closely related. Plans to protect fragile ecosystems must be integrated with plans to meet urgent social needs, and vice versa.

Conclusion #4: Economic growth is an important part of overcoming poverty, but is not enough. National programs for economic and human resource development must target poor people and ensure their access to basic social services, land and other productivity-enhancing resources.

Conclusion #5: Progress against hunger and poverty depends mainly on the initiative of poor people and others in the developing countries. International assistance should support national programs which build on what people are doing for themselves.

Conclusion #6: Industrial country policies regarding trade, debt and development aid often contribute to poverty and hunger. The international economic policies of the United States and

those of other industrialized countries should be reshaped to address the needs of developing nations.

\+ + +

Let me elaborate on the first conclusion. According to Hunger 1990, "Armed conflict and militarization deserve more attention than is usually given in official reports on international development."

The links between hunger and militarization include these:

1. The strengthening of military forces often leads to military rule and/or tighter control over society by a ruling elite, making it more difficult for people to participate freely in efforts to work their way out of hunger and poverty.

2. When conflict erupts, the vast majority of victims are civilians rather than soldiers. That is true whether you consider the number killed or measure the consequences in dislocated people, disrupted economies, poverty and famine.

3. Even when weapons are not used, their cost destroys life--massively and invisibly--because it deprives so many of food and other basic needs. Worldwide military spending is almost one trillion dollars a year--more than the total annual income of the poorest half of the world's population. And although most of that spending occurs in the industrial North, the Third World's share of military spending increased from 7 to 19 percent between 1960 and 1987. Measured in person-years of income, that represents a burden three times higher than the military burden of industrial countries.

That is bad news.

The potentially good news is that with the collapse of communism and the end of the Cold War as we have known it, the world has an unparalleled opportunity to end the arms race and redirect resources toward peaceful development. In January of 1990, with this historic opportunity in mind, Bread for the World launched a three-year "Share the Harvest of Peace" campaign. The platform of that campaign was the "Harvest of Peace Resolution" which, until the Gulf crisis side-tracked congressional action, had obtained impressive public and congressional support, including sponsorship by 173 members of the House of Representatives. The resolution proposed cutting worldwide military spending in half before the turn of the century and shifting efforts toward basic human needs, including the need of so many for more food. A shift of even one percent could, for example, mean another $10 billion toward the reduction of hunger. Well spent, not only would that make an enormous difference in human life, but it would also move us toward a more secure and prosperous world. Think of what a 50 percent shift could mean!

The Gulf crisis, ironically, is breathing new life into the arms race. I say "ironically" because the Gulf crisis illustrates the folly of pouring billions of dollars of military technology into a volatile region of the world. Doing so came back to haunt the world. Nevertheless, there are indications that we are learning the wrong lessons from this crisis.

The war may be seen as an aggression and the punishment of the aggressor, and it was that. But the war also illustrates unintended consequences and shows the link between militarization and hunger. Each day, in our living rooms, we are wrenched by the suffering of a million and a half desperate Kurds. But millions of other innocent Iraqis have been suddenly relegated to a pre-industrial existence without adequate food, water, and health and sanitation services. We hardly see these Iraqis. Nor do we see the plight of hundreds of thousands of alien workers who lost their jobs and possessions as a result of the war. And because it does not make entertaining or emotionally gripping news, we do not see the economic loss that the Gulf crisis imposed on dozens of the world's poorest countries. In these and other ways militarization continues to exact an exorbitant cost in hunger, deprivation and death as a result of the conflict in the Gulf.

Surely a lesson to be learned from all of this--one that could be grasped by a normally perceptive child in school--is that the nations of the world should reduce their trade in arms. And while the Administration advocates precisely such restraint, it has also announced its intention to channel $18 billion in arms transfers to the Middle East next year. Having displayed an awesome test of new military technology, the war has once again whetted appetites everywhere for more advanced weapons. As Newsweek's current cover story on arms sales says in the subtitle, "The war showed the danger of weapons dealing--and gave

it fresh impetus." The war seems to have reinforced reliance on the military as our primary foreign policy tool. Not good news for hungry people.

The Horn of Africa

In addition to the suffering caused by the Gulf war, preoccupation with that crisis has diverted attention and resources from other areas of need. A striking example of this--and of the way in which militarization has spawned hunger--is the Horn of Africa, only 750 miles away from Iraq and a mere 150 miles across the Red Sea from Saudi Arabia. There Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia are in the throes of a famine that could eclipse the horror that unfolded in that region less than a decade ago. According to the latest report from the U.N. World Food Program, 21 million people are at risk of starvation in those countries.

The situation in Sudan is especially grave, with 9-11 million people at risk. According to the most recent report from the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization:

> The food situation is deteriorating at an alarming rate in Sudan. Deaths from starvation and large scale population movements in search of food are reported from many areas. Grain prices have increased drastically and are beyond the purchasing power of large sections of the population. Donor pledges and deliveries fall well short of the minimum needs of the affected population. Only a massive international relief effort can avert further human suffering and loss of life.

Civil war, now in its eighth year in Sudan, and famine have wreaked havoc on an already fragmented society. Through the first half of 1990, Western diplomats say, the government sold

off an estimated 300,000 tons of grain--the country's entire emergency food reserve--to get hard currency to buy arms and oil. Now, U.N. officials estimate that 300,000 Sudanese will perish in the next few months as the much-feared famine has arrived. Even if a massive international effort were mounted immediately, it is too late to save many of these people. And we do not yet know how cooperative the Sudanese government will be regarding relief operations or how swift and extensive the international effort will be. One million tons of food aid are needed, along with fuel and logistic support, and most of the food has to be distributed before the rains in May and June make large areas of the country inaccessible.

In each of the countries on the Horn of Africa, armed conflict is the primary reason for famine. Each country is torn by civil war. And in all three countries the conflicts were fed with a flow of arms from opposing sides in the Cold War to repressive, authoritarian governments. The superpowers once used these countries as pawns, but largely ignore them now that they no longer have the same strategic value.

What can and should the United States do in the Horn of Africa? Emergency relief is the obvious answer--and it is urgently needed. But emergency relief by itself will not address the underlying problems. If that is all we do, we can expect to see recurring and ever worsening famines, not to mention economic and environmental setbacks that will attend them.

The most important step we can take is to press vigorously for peace. David Beckmann, economist at the World Bank and my designated successor at Bread for the World, just returned from a fact-finding trip to that area. He asked people at every level the question, "What is the most important thing the United States can do to help?" And he got, almost without exception, the same answer: Help bring an end to the conflict! The U.S. government has taken some constructive steps in this direction, but much more needs to be done. We should be using every reasonable diplomatic means at our disposal, including especially the United Nations, to exert pressure on all sides to negotiate political settlements. We should press for an end to the transfer of arms to that region. We should continue to withhold, and urge other nations and agencies to withhold non-humanitarian aid to the governments of those countries until serious efforts are being made to negotiate peace, respect human rights, and provide for free elections.

A second step is to press vigorously, utilizing the United Nations, for safe passage of relief supplies even in contested areas. The warring parties in the Horn have persistently used food as a weapon against civilians. The right of civilians everywhere to food and other essentials for survival must be respected.

A third step, consistent with the second, is to utilize all available means, whether or not safe passage is arranged, to get assistance to those in need. This includes use of cross-border

"back doors" to aid civilians in areas controlled by opposition forces.

A fourth essential step is to offer direct longer-term development assistance to both U.S. based and indigenous non-governmental organizations (NGO's) that have been working effectively at the local level and have shown ability to stimulate recovery through participatory, sustainable development. Ultimately the people themselves are the ones who can bring this about, and our efforts should strengthen their capacity to do so.

These principles and initiatives are part of H.R. 1454, the "Horn of Africa Recovery and Food Security Act of 1991," which has been introduced with bi-partisan support that now includes 84 House sponsors. I am deeply grateful to you, Mr. Chairman, and to Representatives Wheat, Bereuter and Boerson, for introducing this important bill. It is absolutely crucial that this legislation be enacted as soon as possible and in the strongest possible form. The need is to move beyond recurring cycles of famine, but that can be done only with bold, intensive efforts toward peace and long-term recovery.

I have focused on the Gulf conflict and the Horn of Africa because they are crises at hand. But Hunger 1990 reports a total of 18 current conflicts that result in hunger. So the larger point is that if we are serious about reducing hunger and poverty, we must move away from excessive reliance on military power. We can find greater security with a much lower level of

spending on arms by promoting peaceful development, respect for human rights and democratic processes. All of this requires the use and strengthening of the United Nations as a peace-making and peace-keeping organization, along with other cooperative regional and international efforts. We need to nurture a growing resolve to live on a higher level of international decency and together address the problems--violence, poverty and environmental destruction--that threaten us all. Doing this will mean strengthening international instruments that exist and creating new ones that may be needed.

I have focused on militarization because it has such a massive impact on hunger and because we are at a moment in which we could bring about a truly historic shift, though we may be letting that opportunity slip away. Let me turn, more briefly than their importance requires, to other strategies for overcoming hunger. I will divide these into short-term and long-term interventions.

Short-Term Interventions

Some interventions against hunger can be made at low cost and have a substantial impact almost immediately or at least within a few years. Several key provisions of the forthcoming Freedom From Want Act of 1991 (and the related World Summit for Children Implementation Act of 1991) illustrate this.

Greatly increased funding for child survival is perhaps the best example. The promotion of breast feeding and growth monitoring, in combination with immunizations and other basic

health measures, could prevent most of the 40,000 daily deaths that occur among young children because of malnutrition and disease. If we are concerned and intervene when thousands of Kurds are threatened, can we have less regard for the far more massive toll that takes place daily among vulnerable children? It is true that the children who die are scattered throughout the world; their deaths are not visible to us and therefore are not emotionally compelling to us. Regrettably, those deaths are not considered politically significant, so we largely ignore them. But for a fraction of one percent of what the world spends each year on arms, most of those deaths could be prevented.

A domestic example from the bill is full funding, over a five-year period, for the Special Supplemental Feeding Program for Women, Infants and Children (WIC). Adequate funding for WIC, food stamps, child nutrition programs, and other programs of proven effectiveness that provide a safety net for people who are undernourished or vulnerable to hunger in our own country, would eliminate most hunger in the United States.

Another example of strategies to make substantial rapid gains against hunger is the Bellagio Declaration of 1989, which has attracted widespread interest but not enough support. The Bellagio Declaration proposes four goals to be achieved before the turn of the century. They are:

1. Eliminate famine deaths through improvement of early warning and response systems and safe passage of food in zones of armed conflict.

2. End hunger in one half of the poorest households with measures to increase small-farm agricultural production, new work and income for some of the poorest rural households, and subsidized food for some of the poorest urban dwellers and particularly vulnerable groups in the Third World.

3. Cut malnutrition among women and children in half. Expanded child survival programs, along with special help, such as improved birth spacing and nutrition supplements for women of reproductive age, would be among the means required to reach this goal.

4. Eradicate iodine and vitamin A deficiencies. Vitamin A capsules, taken two or three times a year by young children between the ages of one to four, could protect 280 million children at risk of vitamin A deficiency; and provision of iodized salt and iodized oil could eliminate most of the 190 million cases of goiter.

To greater or lesser degrees these strategies for near-term initiatives against hunger are effective, measurable and relatively inexpensive.

Long-Term Interventions

Looking beyond safety-net measures to longer-term structural solutions, employment is the first critical piece. In eliminating hunger in the United States, no single factor is more important than jobs--jobs with adequate pay, jobs that lift people above the poverty line. Full employment, with the government as employer of last resort, should be among the

nation's highest priorities. Job training, effective education, health insurance, and day care for children of working parents are essential related needs. In addition, the nation should tax itself to pay for these initiatives and distribute the burden in accordance with ability to pay.

In the Third World, as well, hunger will be reduced most successfully by enabling people who are extremely poor to produce and earn enough to sustain themselves and their families. Small-scale food producers, wage earners and aspiring entrepreneurs must have opportunity to contribute productively to their societies and realize benefits in better nutrition, health and education. In order for this to happen, free enterprise will have to play a pre-eminent role--but it must be free enterprise for the many, not just the few. A nation must ensure that all can participate in its economic life and growth, avoiding wealth and income extremes that prevent this from happening, while allowing access to productive assets and essential public services.

The strategies to carry this out will need to focus especially--though not exclusively--on the local level. That is where people need most of all to participate freely in making decisions and changes that can improve their lives. An example of this approach is the work of IFAD (the U.N. International Fund for Agricultural Development) which specializes in getting small-scale credit and assistance to economically poor farmers and rural laborers, enabling them to become more productive and

self-sufficient. And as the Horn of Africa Recovery and Food Security Act of 1991 also illustrates, much more needs to be done to release energies at the grass roots by strengthening non-governmental efforts and allowing people to act on their own behalf.

In addition to specific strategies that are carried out within each country, economically poor countries in particular are often affected by broad factors over which they have limited control, but concerning which the United States has comparatively large influence. Third World indebtedness illustrates this. In recent years debt payments have taken more resources out of many developing countries than they receive through export earnings, investments, loans and grants, creating a situation in which poor countries assist the rich. Clearly more must be done, as we have done in the case of Poland, to deal constructively with this incongruity through such means as debt forgiveness, debt-for-development swaps, and the renegotiation of terms.

Trade is another such force. Trade barriers in the U.S. and other industrial countries are major obstacles to development and therefore to the reduction of hunger for many developing countries. As the current case of Mexico illustrates, the United States and other countries should move toward the gradual elimination of those barriers, but in the setting of compliance with universal standards for environmental and worker's right.

U.S. foreign aid should be redefined to make hunger and poverty reduction, along with respect for human rights and

democratic processes, our primary objective with regard to developing countries. In the past our aid program, driven by the Cold War, has been preoccupied with military and security considerations. It is time to realize that our own security and economic interests are intimately bound with those of other countries, and we serve everyone best if we help empower poor people economically and politically. Helping people mobilize their own resources, strengthening local non-governmental institutions, enhancing the role of women in development, helping people achieve food and health security and educational opportunity--these are among the priorities that a redefined U.S. aid program should pursue.

For many of the strategies here proposed, no additional outlay would be required, simply a better use of money that we are already spending. The Horn of Africa bill illustrates that. Other strategies require additional resources. In those cases we can, of course, save money by not spending--but then let us be clear that we are saving the way we might save by not fixing a leaky roof. It is an expensive way of saving money.

We do not know everything there is to know about eliminating hunger. But we know a great deal, and we can build on that. The basic problem is not a lack of understanding, lack of technology or even a lack of food, but the lack of will. As Secretary of State Henry Kissinger said at the 1974 World Food Conference, for the first time in history the world has the capability of

overcoming hunger, and therefore if we do not move toward this goal, we can attribute the result to failure of will.

When hunger is unnecessary, it is also morally unacceptable.

We are a human family. There is enough food for everyone and there is enough work for everyone to contribute to the common good. Let's make sure that everyone has a chance to contribute and that there is a place at the table for everyone.

John Swenson
Deputy Executive Director
Catholic Relief Services

Testimony before a Hearing of the
International Hunger Task Force of the
House Select Committee on Hunger
April 25, 1991

Mr. Chairman, members of the Task Force, thank you for inviting me to speak on behalf of Catholic Relief Services today. Catholic Relief Services supports programs to promote development and meet the needs of impoverished people in 73 countries. We have worked with communities and local organizations to meet these needs under all kinds of conditions since 1943. In the last decade we have observed a growing number of people suffering the effects of poverty and hunger in many countries. We welcome the opportunity to discuss the extent, the causes and some potential contributions we in the United States can make to their solution.

What are the Faces of Hunger Today?

What are the faces of hunger today? In Africa, in countries such as Angola, Sudan and Ethiopia, hunger comes from a combination of drought and conflict: in Latin America, the burdens of the international debt crisis have been borne in great measure by the poor and hungry: in Asia, inequities between rich and poor in rural areas, coupled with a lack of access to land and credit by the poor have increased the overall numbers of hungry people.

Africa: The 1980s were a lost decade for Africa: poverty grew while many governments were increasingly unable to meet basic needs and to play a leadership role in the development of their societies. The policy prescriptions of multilateral lenders have often added to the burden borne by the poor, as a shrinking state

and increasingly open market have produced unemployment, higher food prices for consumers and a reduction in government services. The erosion of the state's leadership role in many countries has left a vacuum as yet largely unfilled in many countries.

The emergencies in Africa, in Sudan, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Angola stem in large measure from warfare that has lingered for decades, disrupting agricultural production and food markets, displacing hundreds of thousands and damaging already tenuous economies. Liberian society has been completely destroyed by last year's war, which has yet to be resolved.

Latin America: The impact of debt, slumping global markets and structural adjustment on Latin America has been dramatic. Poverty and hunger levels were higher in 1990 than they were in 1980. Typically, twenty to thirty percent of government revenue goes to servicing international debts. Cutbacks in government services, coupled with high inflation and unemployment have battered the poor.

Asia: Despite increases in agricultural production in many Asian countries, millions of Asians continue to be hungry. Subsistence farmers who are vulnerable to natural disasters make up much of the population in the Indian subcontinent. Landlessness and the lack of adequately paying jobs make it almost impossible for many in south and southeast Asia and the Philippines to earn

enough to eat. Conflict in Vietnam, Cambodia and Afghanistan have disrupted normal food supplies.

Solutions

Before discussing some specific measures, let me outline three principles drawn from the experience of Catholic Relief Services.

First, poverty is the cause of hunger. Even in situations of acute emergency and famine, our experience shows that adequate food is almost always available for those who can afford it. Those who suffer from chronic hunger are likewise those who lack the means to produce or purchase food. The barriers to well being are many and varied: landlessness, low wages, inadequate access to water, fertilizer, credit or other key inputs, poor health, and the decline of the natural resource base under long-term abuse are among them.

Second, lasting impact on hunger and poverty require the empowerment of poor people and their communities and organizations to take initiative to solve their own problems. "Empowerment" is a fashionable term, used in a variety of ways. I mean by empowerment the freedom of poor people to organize themselves to meet their own objectives, and that larger organizations, both governments and donors, take these initiatives seriously. It implies pluralism in societies, openness to development initiatives by a variety of institutions, government and non-governmental.

What we know about the causes and prevention of famine -- acute hunger -- supports this view of the need for pluralism in

addressing chronic hunger. Famine is prevented most effectively by the existence of open institutions and a free flow of information. As recent experience in the Horn of Africa testifies, famines becomes most serious when governments do not or will not respond to needs that are well known. Participation by the poor in this full sense of open and accountable institutions at local and national levels is the first and best preventive measure.

In attacking chronic hunger, the same principle applies: lasting solutions have most often developed where people have been able to organize and to undertake their own initiatives without hindrance, and when these initiatives gain the support of governments and donors. This is not to say that organization among the poor is a sufficient measure to end poverty and chronic hunger. It does mean that freedom to organize and the initiatives that follow from such organization are necessary conditions to lasting progress.

Addressing chronic hunger requires that impoverished people and communities have access to basic needs. Investing in human resources, which was de-emphasized by some of the major donors in the 1980s, remained the main aid strategy of Catholic Relief Services and of many PVOs. Human resources are now being recognized anew, as signalled by the World Bank's focus on poverty in its 1990 World Development Report.

Donors such as the World Bank de-emphasized education, health and social needs in the 1980s in order to focus on lending to change national economic policy. We are seeing the effects of this

inattention to basic needs in deteriorating health conditions and increased poverty and hunger in much of Latin America and Africa. One stated reason for de-emphasizing investment in human resources was disillusion over the continuing, recurring costs of such projects. Donors were right to worry when health, irrigation, water and other programs required long-term external funding, or died away after foreign finance ended. But the solution that has been widely adopted, charging fees for such services, has been only partly effective, and sometimes counterproductive where the welfare of the poorest people is concerned.

Donors should instead heed the lessons already collected in (among others) the World Bank's Operational/Evaluation review of rural development projects from 1968 to 1985, published in 1988. The review found that cooperation with previously existing local organizations was a key predictor of projects' success and the sustainability and durability of their effects.

Short Term Solutions

If empowerment of the poor is the ultimate goal to alleviate hunger, some short-term solutions have proven themselves effective:

* Efforts to use food aid creatively will continue to be needed. At CRS, we recently embarked upon a $3.29 million grant to strengthen our food aid capabilities and develop innovative ways to provide food while empowering individuals and strengthening local communities. Programs we have implemented to combine food aid with access to credit have shown great promise: in Indonesia,

we are providing 15,426 women in maternal child health centers with productive loans. We will be actively exploring further such initiatives.

* The poor have proven that they can markedly improve their lives through access to credit. They can use productive loans to become genuine participants in the economic life of their societies, managing their own sustainable loan programs, saving, educating their children and working within their communities to provide their own social services. Poverty lending and microenterprise programs are emerging as the two components of a unified strategy to reach expanded numbers of poor people in a cost effective manner. We heartily encourage their further expansion worldwide.

* Child survival strategies should be extended to address the causes as well as symptoms of child malnutrition and mortality. This committee has played a leading role in mobilizing U.S. support for preventive health measures that save the lives of children, producing a success story that is all too rare in the field of official development aid. The same energy and commitment must be applied to addressing the causes of ill health and mortality among children, including poverty, unemployment, environmental degradation, and inadequate education. If we do so with a commitment to supporting and working through local NGOs and community organizations, we can reasonably hope to have a part in building a lasting network of organizations and initiatives.

The next steps aren't likely to be as quick or as politically

easy. But the effects of child survival efforts to date are almost certain to be impermanent without them. Child survival policies, have been undercut, for example, by fiscal pressures facing governments and ministries of health. Debt, poor markets for exports and pressure by international lending institutions for lower government spending mean that many health services that were once free are now provided for a fee, if they are available at all. It should come as no surprise that CRS and other agencies now observe mothers and children failing to avail themselves of preventive care because of the cost.

Global Economic Justice

The Catholic Bishops of the United States tell us in Economic Justice for All that the misery of the poor in low income countries is not the "inevitable result of the march of history or of the intrinsic nature of particular cultures, but of human decisions and human institutions." The economies of low income countries depend on our decisions: how we conduct our trade, lending, economic and agricultural policies affects their standards of living.

U.S. trade policy must be balanced so that developing countries are allowed access to markets and are given fair prices for their commodities. U.S. policy should ensure that the poorest segments of society in the developing world are not exploited solely to ensure low commodity prices in the U.S. Poor countries should be given special consideration under GATT agreements.

The burdens of the international debt crisis have increased hunger worldwide. Many of the low income countries have such daunting debt and debt service burdens that they cannot invest in development or in increasing the quality of life for their largely poor populations. For instance, Pakistan's debt service is 25 percent of exports, and 1988 interest payments on external debt were about 45 percent of the net disbursements of all official development assistance. In 1988, interest payments alone on external debt by the low-income countries of sub-Saharan Africa equalled about $2.9 billion.

The debt crisis afflicts and oppresses large numbers of people who are already severely disadvantaged. It is the poorest people who suffer when countries are required to undergo austerity measures. They suffer when food cannot be imported or food prices are high, and when government-supported social programs are cut. Creditors must keep them in mind as they find ways to alleviate the pressures placed on the debtor nations, especially those in sub-Saharan Africa.

Emergency Programs

War, famine and drought intertwine to bring misery to millions of civilians around the world. In Africa, the populations of northern Ethiopia, southern Sudan, Mozambique, Liberia and Angola are trapped in a cycle of violence. Agricultural production has been disrupted by war and drought, millions have been displaced and traditional coping mechanisms for those who stay on the land have

been severely damaged. Five and one-half million refugees from Afghanistan continue to seek shelter in Pakistan and Iran, and in Cambodia, the threat of famine and violence hangs over much of that country's war-weary population.

CRS, is assisting these populations in many countries, including Ethiopia, Angola, Liberia and Sudan, despite the constraints placed on relief in situations of conflict, where lines of authority are not clear, security is threatened, monitoring is difficult and food is often used as a weapon by the opposing parties.

We have been asked to speak on the impending crisis in the Sudan, where the numbers of people at risk range from 7 to 10 million. OFDA has estimated that Sudan's food deficit equals ten times the amount of aid needed during the 1988 famine which claimed the lives of more than 250,000 victims. Grain prices are eight to ten times higher than one year ago, and livestock prices are the lowest they have ever been. People are migrating seeking food, water and jobs. CRS/Kenya continues to hear reports of difficult local situations; although thousands are not starving in concentrated refugee camps, they are dying alone in isolated villages.

CRS works in southernmost Sudan, delivering relief commodities to war displaced people in the SPLA-held areas of Torit in Eastern Equatoria and Kaya in Western Equatoria, as well as the government-controlled garrison town of Juba, where we work with Lutheran World Federation, SUDANAID, the Church's relief arm in Government-held

areas, and CART, the Combined Agencies Relief Team. We are working with the Diocese of Torit and the SPLA's relief arm, the SRRA, to implement an agricultural rehabilitation program serving approximately 32,000 farm families in Eastern Equatoria. We also support the New Sudan Council of Churches to strengthen the ability to implement relief, rehabilitation and development programs in southern Sudan.

Although the civil war is the root cause of this famine, it has been exacerbated by the reluctance of both sides to cooperate with relief efforts. The government of Sudan's refusal until recently to recognize the severity of the crisis was particularly detrimental to organizing an early international response. Until there is some cessation of hostilities and movement toward a political solution to the conflict, the likelihood is that hunger will continue to imperil the poorest elements of the population, north and south, for a long time to come.

The Gulf War also limited communication and understanding between the Government of Sudan and the donor governments, delaying the signing of agreements and the laying of ground work for relief efforts in the North. We have been informed that the government has increased its cooperation with relief agencies working in the North, allowing them to operate more freely. Continued and increased cooperation by the government is crucial. Because of the delays and the extremely difficult logistical problems, many people will probably die even if the international response proceeds unimpeded. However, additional resources need to be committed by

donor governments to minimize the famine's effect.

As of April 8, of the 1.2 million metric tons of emergency relief food required for the Sudan, 526,021 MT has been pledged and 94,101 MT has been delivered. An additional 175,000 MT is expected to arrive in Port Sudan in April. Donors must commit additional food and funds immediately. It takes months to order, ship and deliver food aid to isolated villages. Moreover, an additional 300,000 MT will be needed just to replenish emergency stocks. Donors must respond particularly in the South, where only 48,900 MT of the required 300,000 MT has been pledged.

Both sides of the conflict must accept and act according to the principle that food should be provided unimpeded, to all those in need, where ever they may be. We have heard reports that food stocks in garrison towns in the South such as Juba, Yei, Wau and Malakal are particularly low at this time. The future of the Juba airlift is uncertain and UN flights to SPLA-held areas have been suspended. The only way to ensure that food travels in a cost effective manner is to allow corridors of safe passage into these besieged towns and SPLA-controlled areas.

CRS, the U.S. government and many other agencies have supported these airlifts as the only way to save the displaced. We urge both parties to the conflict to respect the corridors of tranquility so that an adequate supply of food can reach those in the garrison towns. Furthermore, we believe that the hundreds of thousands of displaced people trapped in the garrison towns who are utterly reliant on food aid should be allowed to return to their

homes. Their home areas are largely peaceful. They will continue to need assistance though but not at the same levels required now, but they will have an opportunity to work the land and plant crops and hopefully return to some reasonable measure of self-sufficiency.

We hope that the United Nations will negotiate effectively with the Government of Sudan. The U.N. and the Government have reached agreement on many obstacles to relief programs in the North. The U.N. has not been as effective in securing the Government's cooperation for programs in the South. The Government of Sudan has recently imposed a set of restrictions on NGO's operating in the South. It has also consistently delayed or rejected the flight plan for OLS II. The World Food Programme is responsible for the areas around Bor, Pibor and Tindalo in the south, yet it has failed to secure adequate food donations. Unless agreement among the warring parties and the U.N. is reached, many people in the both SPLA- and Government-held areas in the South will perish.

A U.S. Strategy to Combat Hunger?

Catholic Relief Services has long cooperated with the U.S. government in procuring and distributing Title II food commodities. Refugees and others in need of emergency aid throughout the world have benefited from the generous response of the American people, carried out through U.S. government agencies. Nonetheless, we would be hard-pressed to show that the U.S. government has pursued

a comprehensive anti-hunger strategy. Any sure strategy would embrace all aspects of U.S. relations with the underdeveloped countries, including finance, trade and agriculture. But even looking solely at the development assistance and humanitarian programs explicitly directed toward ameliorating of poverty, many of which have borne fruit over the years, we find reason for concern.

In re-formulating its objectives and proposing a new organizational framework, USAID appears largely to have left unarticulated the most important humanitarian objectives of the development aid programs. The agency's new mission statement barely touches on poverty alleviation as a priority. The administration's proposed new Foreign Assistance Act is similarly silent on the issue of global poverty. And, while we support a more efficient USAID management structure, we fear that the proposed reorganization of USAID would diminish the agency's ability to cooperate with non-government organizations by significantly reducing the role and resources of the office that coordinates its work with private agencies.

USAID support for lending for small enterprise development among the poor has become a valuable feature of U.S. development assistance. We would hope that the agency would give priority attention -- and resources -- to the distinctive tasks of poverty lending, in which credit resources are made available through institutional arrangements that allow the participation of those virtually without material resources, the poorest of the poor.

We are encouraged by USAID support for selected anti-poverty programs, including some in which CRS also participates. But we believe that U.S. development and humanitarian assistance should also be willing to devote the time and patience required to work systematically with local organizations of the poor. This commitment is a cornerstone of the institutional "division of labor" we propose in the following paragraphs.

U.S. Government Policies Against Hunger: What are tne appropriate roles for NGOs, local organizations, governments, and donors?

Beginning with the principle that local action and initiative is a key element, we believe that the way to arrive at the appropriate roles is by asking how best to support, nurture and protect local organizations and their initiatives. This means that:

Governments should to allow local organizations to organize and operate without fear of oppression, and without undue licensing and other restrictions. Donors can help encourage this policy by emphasizing to government officials the importance of local NGOs. This freedom of operation should include the ability to articulate needs and aspirations of local communities, as well as delivering services and managing projects.

Government agencies and donors should work to establish cooperative relationships with local NGOs that allow governments and donors to learn from local efforts. Pilot projects and

demonstration efforts can help to link small-scale local initiatives with larger-scale resources.

Direct financing of locally proposed initiatives has been proven successful on a small scale by the Inter-American Foundation and by some NGOs. But for USAID and the multilateral donors, obliged to work with governments and to finance projects on a larger scale, funding individual micro-projects is only a small part of the answer. The more significant answer, which can improve the quality of all major donors programs, is building into project design, implementation and evaluation a genuine exchange with local organizations of people affected by the project. Sometimes this dialogue may be facilitated by a national-level or international NGO.

With or without such facilitation, donor organizations need to develop the means and the commitment to listen to the impoverished people who ultimately implement the projects, and take their needs and priorities seriously in planning. This consultation takes time. It will probably slow the disbursement of some project funds. But ignoring it is comparable to ignoring a new technology -- high-yielding seed varieties, or the components of the Child Survival campaign, for example -- because adopting them requires change in the donor agencies.

International PVOs such as CRS are increasingly emphasizing their role as supporters of local and nationally-based organizations. This support involves cooperatively designing projects and programs with local organizations, responding to their

initiatives with funding or other forms of support, and facilitating the flow of information between people in North and South.

International NGOs can also make resources and training available that allow local organizations to expand their programs or to develop accounting and other practices that allow them to deal more successfully with government and international donors. International NGOs may also help to make local positions and needs heard by governments and donors.

Throughout the 1980s USAID, the World Bank and other major donors emphasized the need to remove state-imposed barriers on the private sector, in order to set free the "magic of the marketplace" in development. The time is past due for full recognition of the power of the equally-pervasive non-for-profit private sector, and for a commitment from donors to use their leverage to remove barriers to the operation of this "other private sector."

National Expenditure Priorities



Source: "Human Development Report 1990," UNDP

Aid to Africa

Priorities in U.S. Foreign Assistance



* Administration Request.
Source: CRS, AID Congressional Presentation, FY 1987, FY 1992.

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During the Cold War, After the Cold War

Priorities in U.S. Foreign Assistance



* includes Special Assistance Initiatives for the Philippines and Eastern Europe.

** Administration Request.

Source: CRS, AID Congressional Presentation, FY 1987, FY 1992.